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The development of globalized semiconductor manufacturing processes and supply chains
has lead to an increased interest in hardware security as new types of hardware based attacks,
called hardware Trojans, are being observed in industrial and military electronics. To combat
this, a technique was developed to help analyze hardware designs at the register-transfer-level
(RTL) and locate points of interest within a design that might be vulnerable to attack. This
method aims to eventually enable the creation of an end-to-end design hardening solution
that analyzes existing designs and suggests countermeasures for potential Trojan attacks.
The method presented in this work uses a set of base heuristics to evaluate the signals
and logic within an RTL design. These signals and their assignments are ranked according
to different heuristic selection criteria to determine if they belong to one of three types for
potential behavior modification Trojans. The first type aims to identify locations for highly
destructive Trojans that could completely inhibit device function. The second corresponds
to locations where an intermittent issue could be created, such as errors in calculation edge
cases. The final type considers critical signals used to connect submodules within a design,
potentially limiting communication or injecting false data into calculations if attacked. Once
ranked, the top-most location for each of these three groups is reported in a ranked list. From
this list, markers can be automatically placed in copies of the original design files to indicate
where a potential Trojan attack could occur.
This approach was validated by using it to analyze two hardware designs. The results were
v
investigated manually, where high-level understanding of the designs was used to evaluate
the potential implications of each location selected. This validation demonstrated that this
automatic process can not only identify signals and locations similar to what a domain-expert
might select for Trojan insertion manually but can also locate novel sites for potential Trojans
that may not be apparent by an initial human evaluation.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
As the design and manufacture of complex semiconductor devices has become more decen-
tralized, new issues regarding device hardware security have come to light. Many companies
now rely on components drawn from multiple sources of third-party intellectual property
and large software design packages, as well as a globalized set of manufacturing facilities
and supply chains. With each of these comes the opportunity for tampering by an outside
or inside source, be it for profit by selling low quality or fake components, or by an entity
wishing to do harm to those using a specific component. While most bad hardware dis-
covered is the byproduct of test escapes, design errors, and counterfeiting, some hardware
has been discovered to contain malicious components hidden in the design, called hardware
Trojans. These hardware Trojans create new challenges for the field of cybersecurity and the
hardware security sub-domain. As a result of some recent discoveries and increased public
interest in hardware security, the last decade has seen an explosion of interest in hardware
Trojans, how they are inserted, who is inserting them, and how to defend against them.
The main concern of this investigation is hardware Trojans and where they can be placed
within an existing design. Hardware Trojans differ from the other categories of bad hard-
ware components in that they are intentionally malicious and seek to enable some sort of
external attack by an outside source against the component into which they are inserted.
While the other types of bad hardware create danger through lack of quality control, under-
specification, or reliability issues, the existence of Trojans are indicative that an adversarial
entity wishes to do harm to some targeted device and its users. This means that an ad-
versary has found a point of entry that exists in the design or manufacturing stages for
a device and may affect a large number, if not all, of the devices manufactured. For this
reason, hardware Trojans are sometimes called genetic, in that they are built into a design
and become inherent to it after manufacture. This makes it necessary that a wide variety
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different of kinds of Trojans and how Trojans are created be studied and understood so that
appropriate defenses and countermeasures can be created.
This is an unsolved area of research, as new threats emerge constantly. It has become
clear in recent years that hardware security is now a necessary component in electronic design
methodologies. Thus, in an effort to combat this growing number of hardware Trojans, an
end-to-end approach is being developed to harden pristine (Trojan-free) designs to Trojan
insertion as well as create countermeasures to help detect and rectify Trojan activity in
an otherwise functioning circuit. To create this end-to-end approach, it is necessary that
Trojans specific to the design being evaluated are considered on a case-by-case basis. To
this end, a method to create new Trojans for insertion into each pristine design is necessary,
so that Trojan effects can be studied and countermeasures can be created and inserted into
the hardened design automatically. The goal of the work presented in this discussion was
to create a method that could automatically identify locations in which an attacker would
be interested in placing certain types of hardware Trojan in a pristine circuit. With easily
available examples to evaluate, a closed loop tool-chain can later evaluate potential Trojans at
these sites, simulate their effects, and develop countermeasures to these Trojans accordingly.
While Trojans can be inserted in a variety of ways, alterations at the register-transfer-level
(RTL) will be the primary consideration in this discussion.
The method created here relies on two sets of base metrics, one for ranking signals
and one for ranking lines of register-transfer-level code (locations), that are used to select
optimal sets of signals and locations from each module within the design. These heuristics are
derived from important characteristics of the RTL code being studied, such as connectivity
information and high-level conditional structures. These characteristics were identified due
to their use in instances where researchers inserted Trojans by hand for study. While useful
for small experiments, hand insertion takes time and does not allow for large numbers of
Trojans to be evaluated within a design easily. This automatic method requires no prior
knowledge about the design other than its RTL code, and thus it allows for design level
analysis with no user interaction and is completely agnostic to the intended functionality of
the design in question.
The remainder of this discussion will be organized into the following chapters: First,
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some background information on hardware Trojans, how Trojans are classified, and how
this future product aims to help defend against them will be provided in Chapter 2. Then,
to better ground the discussion, information about previous work and the state-of-the-art
for certain topics relevant to this investigation will be given in Chapter 3. From lessons
learned in previous work, a software tool was constructed to help identify potential Trojan
locations automatically. The details of this tool’s processing steps are described in Chapter
4, and the heuristic scoring mechanisms used to rank locations are described in Chapter
5. To verify the tool’s functionality, analysis was conducted on two Verilog designs, and
the results are presented in Chapter 6. Finally, in Chapter 7, several recommendations for
future hardware designs are made based on observations from this investigation alongside





As the semiconductor industry has become more widespread, both in terms of application
and geographic distribution, serious concerns about device security have emerged. Many of
these concerns come from that fact that all design and manufacturing steps are not managed
by the same entities, as there are many parties involved in the global supply chains. This
indicates the potential for attacks from untrusted fabrication facilities or intellectual property
(IP) vendors, as well as a large insider threat from compromised individuals within trusted
entities. Since the dawn of the system-on-a-chip (SoC) era, devices have become more and
more complex, making the process of functionality testing much more difficult. This is true
even before one considers the complexity of verifying that no malicious elements have been
added to the design. With more mission and life critical systems being built using these
complex designs, it is necessary that work be carried out to investigate how designs can be
exploited and what countermeasures can be taken.
In 2008, a landmark publication from the IEEE Spectrum titled “Hunt for the Kill Switch”
brought many of these fears to the surface [1]. This analysis was by no means the first
publication on the topic, but it is seen by some as the first general discussion of the issue
for a wide audience. Its analysis, although somewhat surface level, discusses what many
speculate to be one of the largest instances of electronic warfare so far and outlines many
of the concerns the military and commercial entities have about the modern semiconductor
industry. These concerns reach every area of the engineering space, as topics related to the
logistics of manufacture, hardware choices, supply-chain details, software, access control,
and testing practices are all issues that could have a large impact on the trust that can
be placed in a chip. For this reason, several programs, such as Defense Advanced Research
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Projects Agency’s (DARPA) now concluded “Trust in IC” program, and new fields of research
will continue to help study hardware vulnerabilities. Work to ensure secure electronics for
commercial and military use is still on-going over a decade after this initial publication.
2.1.1 Types of Trojans
Hardware Trojans come in many different “shapes” and sizes, as their functionality, trig-
gering conditions, and implementations are all specific to the design into which they are
inserted. That said, it is useful to have a sort of classification system to help describe Tro-
jans and their components. One of the earliest publications on this was a taxonomy system
described by researchers at the University of Connecticut and University of New Mexico in
2008 [2]. Since then, many updates have been provided to chart out hardware Trojans and
how they can be understood in terms of their characteristics [3] [4]. Using the definitions
in later work [4], Trojans can be easily classified using three high-level descriptors: physical
characteristics, how a Trojan is implemented using the device it is inserted into, activa-
tion characteristics, sometimes called the trigger, which is how the Trojan activates itself,
and action characteristics, sometimes called the payload, which is how the Trojan affects
the function of the design. Each of these areas has various subcategories that are used to
give a language to specify implementation and functionality details, allowing for high-level
evaluation and discussion of Trojans. The following taxonomy is provided in [4].
2.1.1.1 Physical Characteristics
The Physical Characteristics of a Trojan seek to mainly explain how a Trojan manifests
within a design in terms of its hardware implementation details, such as changes to masks,
insertions of new logic components, or alterations to manufacturing processes. These char-
acteristics say nothing of the logic or operation of the Trojan itself and seek only to describe
how it was inserted. This set of criteria covers both Trojans inserted at the RTL and Trojans
inserted at manufacturing, as it can describe changes to existing layout information or the
addition of entirely new logic. Four criteria are used here:
1. Distribution - Trojan’s location and reach within the design.
2. Size - Approximate number of elements changed to implement the Trojan.
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3. Structure - Whether or not the layout of the design was recreated to introduce a Trojan.
4. Type - Specifies if the Trojan is functional, realized through altering logic, or parametric
information. (realized through altering electrical characteristics).
2.1.1.2 Activation Characteristics
The Activation Characteristics are used to describe the conditions necessary for the
Trojan to take effect during circuit operations. They are broken into two major categories:
1. Internally Activated - Trojans are triggered by internal signals and logic within the
design. This can include combinations of signals or state machines, such as counters. In
some situations, such as with some parametric Trojans, the Trojan is always activated.
2. Externally Activated - Trojans are triggered by an outside source using some sort of
sensitization within the design. This can include hardware sensors and antennas to
receive outside triggering signals.
2.1.1.3 Action Characteristics
The Action Characteristics describe the actual effect of a Trojan once it is activated.
There are many ways that Trojans can disrupt a circuit, both directly (e.g. changing its
functionality) or indirectly (e.g. causing it to heat up and thus slow down or consume more
power). Several types of disruption can effect speed, but the mechanism by which this is
done will depend on the implementation of the Trojan. Because there is a very large number
of ways that a circuit can be tampered with, it is important to understand what sorts of
tampering could cause certain issues. This category has three sub-categories:
1. Transmit Information - This includes Trojans that “leak” secure information, such as
encryption keys, out to an unsecured location.
2. Modify Specification - This includes Trojans that change the operating mode of a
circuit. For example, this can be done by changing path delay (thus circuit speed),
causing a chip to consume too much power, or causing a chip generate too much heat.
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3. Modify Function - This includes Trojans that alter the functionality of the the design
in any way. This can be done by adding or removing digital logic, taking control,
altering outputs, corrupting data, etc.
For the purpose of this investigation, Trojans in the modify function classification are of
high interest. Trojans in this category are sometimes referred to using two sub-categories,
Behavior Modifier Trojans and Reliability Impact Trojans [5]. Behavior modifier Trojans are
usually implemented with payloads that intentionally change logic in a specific way to meet
some goal, such as taking over control of a signal or executing a different operation than
expected. Reliability impact Trojans seek mainly to degrade the operation of an existing
function, causing data corruption or slow-down.
Trojans in the modify function category are often easiest to implement at the RTL.
However, Trojans that leak information often depend on side-channels (physical methods
of exporting data as radiation, power-draw, etc.) so evaluating methods for side-channel
export would be incomplete at this level of abstraction. While some RTL information leaking
Trojans have been proven using RTL elements such as multiplexers [6], this thesis does not
take them into consideration. Much work has been conducted on how to detect alterations
to digital logic (functional Trojans), as will be described in Chapter 3.
2.1.2 How Trojans are Inserted
Many potential locations for the insertion of hardware Trojans come from the complexity
of the integrated circuit (IC) design and manufacturing process. Modern devices rely on a
long chain of software packages, design IP (intellectual property available for purchase or
reuse), standard logic cell libraries, and massive compilation tools to convert high-level de-
scriptions of designs into synthesized RTL or layout information for manufacturing. Once this
layout information is produced, a whole different chain of manufacturing steps is necessary
to realize a design in a fabrication facility. For an attacker, this leaves many opportunities to
insert malicious elements into the final product, as any stage where a change can be slipped
into the product unnoticed is a possible avenue of attack.
Typically, designs are first conceptualized in terms of their high-level requirements and
specifications. From there, they are elaborated through behavioral and register-transfer-level
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(RTL) source code that is used to define how a design will be constructed from a functional
point of view. Gate-level representations can then be created from the RTL source in a
process called logic synthesis that converts high-abstraction statements into networks of
logic gates, standard cells, or lookup tables (LUTS), sometimes called netlists. Finally, this
information is converted into the form necessary to the type of technology being used to
implement the design. This can include forms such as a bitstream used to program a field-
programmable-gate-array (FPGA), or the physical layout data for transistors if the design is
being manufactured as an application-specific-integrated-circuit (ASIC). This final process,
sometimes referred to as implementation, is entirely dependent on technology specific IP
and processes. Should the design be destined for full manufacturing, many more steps are
necessary to make the lithography masks and define the process steps necessary to realize
the design in a fabrication facility.
Trojans inserted at the register-transfer-level (RTL) pose a unique threat as any design
created from compromised RTL source code will have the Trojan built into the netlist. This
means that any methods of such detecting Trojans through standard gate-level automated
testing practices after manufacturing will be defeated, because tests automatically generated
for that design will likely take the Trojan’s functionality into account, masking its effects. In
fact, circuits that fail to correctly implement a Trojan (though some manufacturing defect)
will be discarded as defective.
Additionally, designers often rely on third-party IP and external cell libraries to speed
up the design process or physically implement designs. This allows designers access to vast
resources of existing logic and hardware components for easy inclusion into their work. While
useful, this does open the door for more potential security issues, as there is no known way
to guarantee that third-party IP is safe and Trojan free, especially when implementations of
elements are encrypted or obfuscated to protect secret IP details.
Even after a design is fully synthesized and converted into physical layout data, Trojans
can be created through alteration of manufacturing masks or manufacturing processes. By
changing the size or spacing of components, or altering how materials are doped or etched,
small changes in behavior can be introduced through the introduction of unexpected resis-
tance or capacitance. While slight, seemingly small modulations in electrical behaviors can
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lead to changes in delay or can create well hidden Trojan effects.
The approach proposed in this work does not take into account how or at what im-
plementation stage a potential Trojan is inserted into a design, thus ignoring its physical
characteristics described in subsection 2.1.1.1. Rather, its focus is to locate places within
the high-level description that could be dangerous through any attack at any point in the
design or manufacturing process.
2.2 Toward Better Hardware Security
The US Government, US Military, and commercial electronic component producers have
a vested interest in securing electronic products at every level. As a result, there is great
interest in tools that can help to identify and manage hardware vulnerabilities at a large
scale. While there are some tools for hardware security verification, such as that provided
by Cadence [7] and other vendors, no true end-to-end hardware security solutions currently
exist.
2.2.1 The Achilles Tool Flow
To fill the needs of entities aiming to secure their designs and other purchased products,
the “Achilles ” tool-chain was created in collaboration with Amida Technology Solutions, an
industry vendor specializing in data analysis tools. The final tool-chain will seek to not only
conduct preliminary analysis on a pristine design, but to automatically insert and emulate
multiple types of potential hardware Trojans, place instruments to monitor circuit activity,
and provide detection methods to find and classify Trojan behavior when it is present. This
thesis focuses on the first two elements of this tool-chain. This is done by feeding in a
golden model, or pristine circuit design, at the register-transfer-level (RTL) and allowing
the completed tool to identify problem locations. The final tool will then evaluate the
performance of proposed mitigation strategies in terms of additional overhead and potential
Trojan coverage to make informed decisions when evaluating trade-offs. The tool will be
comprised of five main components:
1. Golden Model Analysis - Identifying signals and locations within a design that are
vulnerable to attack (this thesis) as well as searching for locations to place instruments
to monitor circuit activity during operation.
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2. Insertion - Placing hardware components for potential Trojans as well as proposed
instruments to monitor Trojan behavior.
3. Hardware Emulation - Emulation of circuit behavior within a sandbox. This step allows
for data collection for use in Machine Learning based Trojan detection algorithms.
4. Detection - Training of detection functionality for Trojan behaviors. This step seeks
to classify Trojans as certain types as well as estimate impact when possible.
5. Countermeasure Analysis - Evaluation of how effective each instrument and detection
method is for a given Trojan type. Information from this step can be fed back into
step 2 to improve results in an iterative manner.
The work put forth in this thesis will serve as the basis of the first stage of the proposed
“Achilles” tool-chain, giving a high-level threat surface analysis by identifying signals that
are prone to attack as well as providing insight into what logic could be altered to facilitate
a hardware Trojan. The signals identified by this method will be used as a starting point for
instrument insertion as well as to give locations for potential Trojans to be inserted within
an infected version of the the pristine design.




To better understand existing approaches to signal selection, hardware Trojan detection,
and design analysis, several existing domains of research were investigated. While many of
these problem areas are relatively new, they draw on extensive work done by the IC testing,
verification, and security communities. There are many areas of research regarding testing
and Trojan detection, but only topics that are applicable to functional circuit behavior,
rather than parametric issues, will be discussed here.
3.1 Trace Buffer Insertion
Understanding which signals are critical within an design is a task that requires extensive
knowledge of the design and its functionality. While there are myriad methods for verification
in the pre-silicon stages of design, the coverage of these methods is not complete. This means
that some issues are discovered after the design is spun into silicon, or never found at all. To
debug a design once it is manufactured, designers must insert test points to expose internal
signal values to external testing equipment. By choosing these test points wisely, validation
engineers can reconstruct the internal state of a design after testing to help identify potential
issues and trace back errors to their point of origin. While some circuits rely on test points
that expose an internal signal to directly to an output, it is often beneficial to include testing
hardware that can load prepared states and store important data for output. These testing
hardware is usually implemented in one of two ways: scan cells and trace buffers. Scan cells
are implemented as partial or complete replacements for existing registers within a design,
allowing for small increases in area overhead overall. This overhead is justified because they
are often crucial for manufacturing defect detection in digital circuits. Trace buffers are built
from arrays of memory cells that are read like RAM elements. This often require significant
increases in hardware to implement, but offer increased capacity to read out internal circuit
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state at the expense of long data extraction times. As a result, it is necessary that testing
and validation engineers intelligently select locations for this debug hardware as to minimize
the overhead incurred by extra components. Because designs have thousands or millions of
unique signals within them, this process often requires algorithmic optimization, as the search
space is too large to be processed by human domain experts. As such, several approaches
have sought to automate the scan cell and trace buffer insertion processes.
Work for validation and debug by Kanad Basu and Prabhat Mishra of the University of
Florida [8] relies on the concept of signal reconstruction, that is, the process of solving for
a circuit’s internal state using an incomplete trace of a few signals within the component
during testing after manufacture. If the collected signals are selected correctly, the process
of reconstructing the signals within a design becomes a matter of simple Boolean algebra
and simulation. A simple metric for this selection is called the signal reconstruction ratio,
or SRR, that gives the ratio of signals that can be recomputed from trace data for a given
location versus the number that cannot be reconstructed. In their work, Basu and Mishra
provide an approach for estimating the controllability of signals between two flip-flops within
a circuit. This is used as a heuristic to score connected flip-flops and form regions of signals
that are deemed necessary for signal reconstruction. Experiments using this method offered
improvement over previous trace buffer selection routines of the time [8].
Later work by Kamran Rahmani and Prahbat Mishra expanded on this problem when
scan chain cells were to be placed in groups for output to a trace buffer [9]. Specifically,
this means that during test, the full chain was not read, but that the values of specific cells
were recorded to a trace buffer each on cycle. In this work, they present a greedy algorithm
for selecting which cell should be saved at each clock cycle to help ensure better signal
reconstruction by maximizing signal observability [9]. While the details of the algorithm
are not necessary to this discussion, this method relies on a connectivity graph that helps
contextualize signals during each cycle.
Other approaches for trace buffer signal selection have been attempted by Minn Li and
Azadeh Davoodi using a new set of metrics that are used to directly relate the state of one
signal to another. This is done by creating a list of reachable elements from any point while
that point takes on a certain value [10]. This, coupled with other metrics created during
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evaluation such as restorability rate, a measure of how easy it is to recreate a signal at a
given point based on the current solution, allows for the estimation of the dependence of one
signal’s restorability on another. Together, these new metrics allow the algorithm to have
iterative opportunities to expand or change the selection of target signals. This allows the
overall SRR to be increased beyond what a single-pass evaluation might yield [10].
In general, research in this area has sought to inform decision-making on how to select
signals based on their connectivity, as well as how signal dependence can be estimated
from a high level version of the design. This is by no means an exhaustive review of these
topics, as many other approaches, such as the Linear Programming approach in [11] have
been attempted. Primarily, these concepts help give motivation for looking at high level
connectivity graphs for estimating signal importance though metrics and iterative algorithms.
3.2 Signal Flow Checking
More recently, work in the security domain has explored topics related to information
flow checking. These gate-level (designs in the form of networks of logic gates) approaches
use concepts such as confidentiality and integrity (as defined in [12]) to assign flags to signals
of special importance. These flags are then propagated through designs in a modified logic
simulation to determine if certain signal paths cross and cause interference with protected
signals or if information is leaked from a protection region.
A 2016 paper published by researchers at the University of Arkansas, the University of
Florida, and the University of Connecticut presented a new technique called structural check-
ing [13]. This method seeks to describe signals within a design at the RTL as assets, which
are rough high-level classifications of signals, such as timing elements, state information, en-
cryption keys, and other system level concepts. Signals are evaluated by their connectivity,
where the assets associated with a signal are checked throughout its propagation. In this
way, if an asset is leaked to an unexpected location or a signal with sensitive assets is altered
by an other an unrelated signal, the tool can flag it as suspicious. For example, if an encryp-
tion key asset is found at an externally observable location that is not protected, the signals
related to the leaked asset, such as the leaking output, are marked as suspicious [13]. While
useful for the discovery of Trojan locations present in a design, this method does require
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some hand labeling of asset types by the user as an input.
This work was expanded on by some of the same researchers from University of Florida
[12]. In their approach, signals are evaluated through two main steps, confidentiality verifica-
tion, which is the process of determining if information from one region of the design can be
observed from an unsecured location, and integrity verification, which is the process of deter-
mining if a signal has altered or influenced an unrelated or unsecured signal [12]. Together,
these two stages can not only identify if information is leaked or altered, but can also aide in
the detection of Trojan trigger conditions. One major advantage to this approach is that it
utilizes existing automated test pattern generation (ATPG) tools to help find both valid and
suspicious observable points within a design. That said, this reliance on gate-level ATPG
algorithms does limit its capabilities to working only on gate-level, synthesized designs.
Prior to this work, three other important methods of Trojan detection were proposed.
The first is a tool called “JasperGold” created by Cadence. It is one of the few industry tools
that considers hardware security from a design level [7]. Its focus is in verifying that selected
memory elements and registers are not read from or altered illegally following formalized
rules specified by a user. Because it is mainly tuned for memory related applications, it is
not very useful for this investigation. As noted in work by [12], this technique also does not
consider all signals within designs, and it may allow Trojans to go undetected.
Work from a joint project among the University of California San Diego, Northwestern
Polytechnical University, and Tortuga Logic proposed a method calledGate-Level Information-
Flow Tracking, which is often referred to as GLIFT [14]. While this paper is not the first
application of GLIFT, this work uses it specifically to investigate the Trojan detection prob-
lem. This method works by tagging data bits as they propagate through a design, making
note of when valid data path rules are violated or information is moved through an unex-
pected route. While this is useful in some situations, its reliance on formal methods does
give false positives when valid and invalid paths are indistinguishable at a high level [12].
Finally, work from the University of Central Florida, Zhejiang University, and the Uni-
versity of Texas at Dallas [15] proposed a method that evaluates signal sensitivity within a
design though an expansion of concept called proof carrying code. In essence, proof carry-
ing code (PCC) seeks to provide a formal method of proving characteristics of a program
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(or hardware design) by propagating special metadata throughout execution. This is done
by creating a given “sensitivity” score to the pins of a module and propagating the scores
during simulation in time with clock cycles according to rules generated from the RTL code.
By verifying various theorems, or assertions about the state of circuit elements and their
proof information within the circuit at any time step, the tool attempts to verify that no
malicious activity is present. In this application, if provable assertions can be made about
the security of signals that can be checked through simulation, the design is considered safe.
While useful, this method is only as good as the accuracy of the provided sensitivity scores
and is liable to attack by bypassing certain paths within the design that do not violate the
assertions made to check them [12].
3.3 Trojan Placement and Location Analysis
As hardware security research has advanced, access to designs containing Trojans has
become desirable, both for study and benchmarking. While Trojan designs found in the
wild are interesting and provide insight into the mind of a real adversary, access to them is
limited or nonexistent for most researchers and developers, so they are often a last test for
new detection tools. In particular, some Trojans have been found in real-world applications,
but in an effort to keep designs secure, the entities that discover them rarely release any
details about these Trojans or their implications to user safety or security, making them
difficult to study. This means that almost all Trojans available, such as the Trust-Hub
database of Trojans [16], have been created by researchers and are thus limited in number
and scope. To help expand the body of knowledge, researchers at NYU created a tool by
the name of “TAINT: Tool for Automated INsertion of Trojans” [17]. This tool enables
the insertion of Trojan look up tables (LUTs) or field programmable gate array (FPGA)
cells into programmable media. While this tool is automated for the logical insertion of
Trojan components into FPGA designs, it does not help the user identify specific locations
that would be vulnerable to attack and only automates the physical insertion of the Trojan
elements once a site is hand selected by a user. Regardless, it is a useful tool for creating
new infected designs for evaluation of Trojan detection techniques.
Work by Hassan Salmani and Mark Tehranipoor has investigated physical circuit layout
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information to determine if there are locations within a design that were vulnerable to Trojan
insertion [18] in manufacturing steps. This work introduces the concepts of cell analysis and
routing analysis. Cell analysis is the process of detecting locations of empty space that
are larger than the smallest logic element in the technology that could house unintended
logic elements. Routing analysis then evaluates locations where signal lines could be routed
through metal layers to move information for Trojan functionality. This approach was able to
identify interesting locations within synthesized designs that were susceptible to both delay
and power based parametric Trojans. While useful for parametric Trojans, this approach
does not offer the high-level abstraction required for this investigation.
3.4 Register Transfer Level Analysis
With only a few exceptions (see [13]), the Trojan identification problem has been ap-
proached from the gate-level or physical layout information. As a result, it was necessary to
branch out further to understand how hardware source code can be digested at the register-
transfer-level (RTL) and processed meaningfully without the need for a synthesis tool. Most
of the pertinent work in RTL processing comes from the field of testing, as efforts to take
design structure into account to speed up test time and optimize pattern length has created
several interesting data structures for representing circuits.
In a publication from 1998 written by researchers Indradeep Ghosh, Anand Raghunthan,
and Niraj Jha, control and data-flow graphs were used to provide insight into test generation
[19]. This was done by first creating state diagrams of a circuit that represented not only
its internal state transitions but also the flow of data though the design with each cycle.
This structure is called a control-data flow graph (CDFG). This graph gives a cycle-wise
depiction of data and operation flow within a circuit. This graph can also help understand
more about the design’s structure and thus it aids in making more decisions made while
creating a test set. In this representation, circuits can be presented as special forms of
Moore machines, where the transition values can be directly studied and included in the
tests. From this analysis, the tool inserts multiplexers into the data- and control-paths that
increase the observability of the circuit and allow for better logical control by test patterns.
Not only does this identify locations for multiplexer insertion and generate test sets, but it
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does so rather efficiently for data-flow heavy designs [19]. While this method does use the
RTL code, it also requires a gate-level representation of the code, meaning that it is still
reliant on synthesized versions of the design.
Later work by researchers at the Institute of Computing Technology in Beijing presented
an approach for seeking out a special type of fault from the RTL description of a design [20].
This investigation was focused on the discovery of potential transfer faults, or instances
where a value within an assignment or conditional does not properly propagate. This is
done by first creating two important data structures: the process controlling tree (PCT) and
the data dependency graph (DDG). The PCT is a high-level representation of the design’s
conditional elements and assignments in a tree structure that flows from the top of the
design down through condition logic at internal nodes and ends with signal assignments at
the leaves. The DDG is a more granular deconstruction of the RTL, as it represents the
design in terms of smaller expressions and how higher level statements are constructed from
operators and signals, rather than considering entire statements at a time. The DDG stores
these operators and signals at the nodes within the graph and stores their interconnects as
edges. Since this approach is seeking out transfer faults specifically, the edges flowing out
from any node within the DDG can represent a location where a value fails to propagate (a
potential location for a transfer fault). Together, these two structures are used in an ATPG
algorithm named X-Pulling that was measured to greatly improve run-time when compared
to another ATPG tool of the time.
More recently, these works and others were expanded on by Tobias Strauch to create
a high level ATPG scheme. Simply put, this ATPG method uses an abstract fault model
called a gate inherent fault (GIF) that has been expanded to consider function-agnostic
faults from the view of a complex operation’s primary outputs (GIF-PO) [21]. These fault
models are highly abstract and do not rely on the implementation or logic values of any gate.
This allows them to function on complex operations found at the RTL, such as arithmetic
operators or conditional logic, rather than single gates and netlist connections. By focusing
on path propagation rather than any specific logic value related fault, as is present in most
other fault models, this model allows the user to evaluate high level design code at a high
abstraction level without synthesis. The example provided in his work shows this method
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being used on the Verilog “+” operator that synthesizes into a 64-bit adder, a feature not
available in many ATPG methods. While this work is mostly exploratory and does not
outperform more traditional ATPG methods, it is interesting in that it is based solely on
the RTL analysis. Unfortunately, this approach did not gain much traction, so it was not
expanded on further.
While many of these approaches help understand how the RTL source code of a design





To enable more research and the development of an end-to-end hardware security solution,
a new tool flow was created to automatically identify potential locations within a design that
were vulnerable to tampering. This tool was constructed using some existing technologies
for Verilog prepossessing and parsing, as well as custom written algorithms.
This tool is composed of four main components that flow from one to another as shown
in Figure 4.1. Python was used as the main language for development, as it enables not
only rapid prototyping and cross platform support, but also has easy access to extensive and
robust text processing packages. This text processing functionality was necessary to process
and manage much of the extensive Verilog standard. In addition, Python gives access to
simple data structure serialization techniques that allow complex data representations to be
written out to files easily. This functionality means that complex (and lengthy) processes
can be broken down into sub-tasks that can be run separately, allowing for better code
modularity.
4.1 Preprocessing
The first stage of the overall procedure is to process the raw Verilog design files into
simpler code by evaluating preprocessing directives. This accomplishes two main goals. The
first is to remove statements that are not relevant to the actual synthesized design, such
as comments, test-bench code, macro definitions, or synthesis specific details. Second, it
processes alternate code-blocks used to build multiple versions of a design from the same
source code, ensuring only one build target is being processed at a time. If the input design
was written properly, this will guarantee that no duplicate logic, module definitions, or
unnecessary code is present after preprocessing.
































Figure 4.1: Automatic Analysis Processing and Analysis Steps.
While there are several freely available packages that offer some preprocessing functionality,
Verilator can insert line directives (lines of Verliog code that record the original source file
line number during preprocessing), allowing later stages of the tool to properly address lines
from the original source files. Verilator is invoked by a Python wrapper that passes along
relevant flags and directories to preprocess the design. Once preprocessed, the Python script
routes the output of Verilator into a directory containing the entire design’s preprocessed
file equivalents in case they should they be desired by the user.
A secondary preprocessing step is then conducted to clean the preprocessed code further.
This step removes certain unimportant or unprocessable structures such as attributes, gen-
erate statements, and function definitions. This is done to make later stages of processing
easier to parse, as well as remove extraneous input that could confuse the extraction steps.
Once the source file processing is complete, the design is traversed once again to discover
its design hierarchy. This is done using the Verilog-Perl package by Wilson Snyder [23],
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which has inbuilt functionality to discover the hierarchy of a design and output it as a usable
XML format. This output is read in by a Python wrapper and converted to a set of lookup
dictionaries for finding module names and their submodule instances.
Finally, the preprocessed files are read again, this time searching for the line directives
inserted by Verilator. During this pass, a mapping of original source file line to preprocessed
file line is created so that later stages can access original source locations if necessary, as well
as give exact locations for changes in the marker insertion step. This mapping will be kept
along-side the text for the remainder of processing.
The results of these processes are loaded into a queryable data storage structure and
written to a serialized file for access by the next stage.
4.2 Module Extraction
With preprocessed and cleaned text now available, the tool now locates the definition of
each module found in the design hierarchy. To do this, the files discovered by Verilator are
fed into a custom parsing system written in Python. Here the names of the modules are
used within regular expression searches for module definition structures. Once detected, the
text used to define a module is separated into its own container that will serve as the core
of the extraction process.
Once all module definitions have been located, component extraction begins. This is done
by systematically passing over the definition of the module and looking for components that
are key to its functionality, while skipping over some of the remaining extraneous source
text. Using a series of regular expression searches that each look for individual features,
extracted information is stored within module specific data structures.
4.2.1 Module Parameters and Local Parameters
Verilog allows the user to define two types of parameters within a module definition. The
first and more versatile module parameter allows the user to define variable sizes and values
for code reuse purposes. This means that the user can create a general module definition that
can be instantiated in various ways to account for variable sized busses, internal signal values,
or hard-coded data. The second type is an internal parameter called a local parameter. This
is simply a user-defined variable that is inserted during the elaboration step of synthesis.
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These cannot be reassigned during instantiation and are useful mostly for readability and
maintainability of the source code.
Both of these types of parameters are discovered and stored in a dictionary for later use.
During later stages of processing, whenever the value of one of these parameter types is
needed, the tool looks up its definition and inserts it in place of the parameter name. This
steps allows some preprocessing tasks to partially replace some of the steps necessary during
the typical Verilog elaboration process. This can be done without the need to fully elaborate
a module or statement in its complete context, as a true synthesis engine would.
4.2.2 Ports and Signals
To understand module connectivity, both within the module and concerning its connec-
tions to the outside, it is necessary to compile a complete list of the module’s ports (wires
and registers used to connect module logic to external component’s logic) as well as its inter-
nal signals. Again, this process is completed using regular expression searching for Verilog
keywords and capturing data like signal type, name, size, and whether or not it is an input
or output. The results of these searches are stored so that they can be searched for later
when processing other kinds of statements and understanding signal connectivity.
4.2.3 Submodule Instances
Verilog code is inherently hierarchical in structure, as it often reuses many components
multiple times across a design. To allow for simple inclusion of an already existing module
definition within another module, that module definition can be ‘instantiated’ by assigning it
an instance name, optional parameters, and port assignments. For the purposes of this tool,
the type of module and the port assignments are the most important features to extract, as
they will aid in understanding connectivity and signal influence later.
4.2.4 Assignments and Logic Structure
The final stage of parsing is discovering the two main components of design functionality:
signal assignments and conditional statements. Because Verilog follows a recursive style of
code blocks nested within one another, internal logic must be processed accordingly. Unlike
submodule instances and signal definitions, the logic itself cannot be understood using simple
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search techniques as were used for the previous module features, due to its differences in
structure. This is by far the most complex process necessary for module extraction, as it
requires not only iterative syntax searches used to find locate each kind of statement, but also
requires that the recursive nesting of statements be preserved so that logic can evaluated
correctly. While this application does create a simple list of signal assignments for the
purposes of discovering connectivity, it is necessary to keep the logic of a module stored as a
sort of simplified Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) [24] so that module logic can be understood
within its proper context. This tree will serve as the starting point for most of the scoring
techniques later, as it is the most direct representation of the actual module’s functionality,
representing both signal assignment and conditional logic. Once this tree is created from
the source, it is stored along side the other extracted components. This is the final stage at
which Verilog code of any form is read in by the tool, as a complete representation of the
design’s hierarchy, module definitions, and functionality has been created.
4.2.5 Module Connectivity
One final step is completed within the module extraction procedure. While it is not
truly extracting anything from source, this stage traverses the logic trees of each module
and builds a simple graph of how the signals within a module are interconnected. This is
done somewhat naively, as it does not take into account assignment type (continuous or
procedural). The goal of this step is mainly to understand what signals are attached to each
other and in what direction. This will serve as a proxy to signal fan-out and fan-in later
when scoring.
4.3 Scoring and Location Selection
Once all files are preprocessed and important features are extracted, the tool begins the
location selection procedure. Briefly, this is done by calculating a set of metrics for each
signal within a module and matching them with similarly scored logic statements. Since
these metrics are dependent on relationships among signals, this is done in several passes
in order to propagate both intermodular and intramodular relationships. This process is
then repeated using a different set of metrics for the logical statements within that design,
assigning them scores based on structure and complexity.
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Once score assignment is complete, several subsets of each module’s signals are selected
for further investigation. These subsets are selected by taking an optimal sample based on
pairs of metrics, depending on the type of location being investigated. The two criteria
used for detection will dictate what kind of attacks this signal might be vulnerable to, as
well as provide a relative ranking of the signals within each subset. Next, the statements
within a module pertaining to one of these targeted signals will be evaluated based on their
own metrics. To find locations that would be relevant to specific types of potential Trojan
(elaborated more in Chapter 5), statements related to selected signals can be evaluated using
relevant criteria, further pruning the search space. The results from this step are saved as a
list of signals and locations (line numbers in modules) within a design that would be potential
sites for attack.
A more detailed view of these metrics and selection criteria will be provided in Chapter
5.
4.4 Design Level Ranking and Marker Insertion
Once the lists of locations for Trojan insertion have been created for each module, a
global ranking for each attack type can be constructed. This is done by collecting all of
the locations of a certain Trojan type and storing their locations and final scores in a single
sorted list. The top elements of this list can then be selected to give a global ranking of
the most dangerous locations of each type for the entire design. To ensure more variation
between the locations selected, locations from each module are selected in a round-robin
style, forcing one location from each module to be selected before a second can be selected
from the same module.
Additionally, a ranking based on the module depth can also be built. This allows for
some weight to be given to how low or high a module is in the design hierarchy and treat
modules more fairly. This is done by first sorting modules according to their height, where
a height of zero corresponds to the lowest modules in a design (no submodules) to the the
max height of the top module. The global ranking procedure is then run on each of these
height groups. While this is not necessary to create a good ranking of locations in the design,
it can help a designer better identify what types of problems show up in certain modules.
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From experimental investigations, it was found that the global ranking contained most of
the interesting locations found by the depth wise ranking. For this reason, the depth wise
ranking is considered less important.
Once selected, each potential Trojan location is given a tag based on its type and relative
ranking. The source files of each component of the design are then re-opened, and a comment
marker containing information about the Trojan location, such as its ranking and type, are
written into a copy of the source code. This can be done where all markers in each file are
placed into one marked file copy, or a new copy of each file can be generated for each found
location. Once complete, a manifest file is generated to give the user a central list of all of
the selected locations and where they were placed into the design files.
4.5 Limitations of the Tool
Verilog is a robust and powerful language that allows for the creation of massive elec-
tronic designs. That said, it has become quite complex over time, as new functionality has
been added constantly since its creation, and extensions like SystemVerilog only increase this
complexity further. As a result, it is very difficult to implement a fully functional Verilog
parser from scratch. While some open-source Verilog parsing tools exist, they did not meet
the needs of this project. So, a custom parser was implemented to allow for the most impor-
tant features of a Verilog design to be processed, while allowing unsupported structure and
syntax to be ignored. This was done using a hybrid “soft parsing” approach using a regular
expression matching technique applied in a systematic manner to generate a simplified form
of abstract syntax tree (AST), similar to what one might expect from a formal parsing tool.
4.5.1 Edits to Source
In order to meet the limitations of the parser, some small alterations need to be made to
designs being evaluated to compensate for complex or ambiguous structures. These necessary
edits were intentionally kept minor, so as to not require changes to device logic (with one
exception). The changes made for these purposes differ from the text scrubbing preprocessing
step mentioned in section 4.1 in that they must be conducted by a user and are not automatic.
• Multiple Instances of a Module - Some designs make use of Verilog’s ability to instan-
tiate multiple modules of the same type using one statement. These must be unrolled
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to give each submodule instance its own statement.
• Verilog Function Evaluation - While somewhat uncommon, Verilog gives the ability to
define simple functions for calculating values during elaboration. For example, this can
be used to calculate the size of address signals for buses dynamically. These calculations
must be run by hand and the function calls related to them replaced with the static
value the function would return during elaboration.
• Ambiguous nesting - Some uses of nested structures (such as IF and CASE statements)
can cause issues due to their syntax. To resolve this, some statements with one line of
code body may need ‘begin’ and ‘end’ keywords added to remove ambiguity.
• Expressions in Module Port Assignment - Verilog allows the user to assign module
ports to complex expressions during instantiation. While useful, this is difficult to
parse, so any ports assigned in this manner need to be connected to an intermediate
signal that is assigned the value of the expression of the original port connection. This
may slightly change the gate-level netlist, but does not change the functionality.
All of these issues could be remediated by expansion of the parsing component’s func-
tionality.
4.5.2 Device IP and Auto-Generated Code
Many modern designs rely on large libraries of third-party IP as well as automatically
generated code from electronic-design-automation (EDA) tools. As a result, some function-
ality of the circuits being evaluated may be left out, as attempts to obfuscate IP imple-
mentations make them difficult to parse or some files may be missing from the RTL source
entirely. In addition, since many tools will offer automatic generation of some components
using customizable library modules, some implementations are not created by the tool until
the elaboration and synthesis step. This means that some of the RTL source provided will
not contain all of the necessary details to fully evaluate these modules. To manage these
two issues, modules defined in either manner will be removed from the design hierarchy for
processing by the tool and will be seen only as submodules within modules that instantiated
them. This allows signals going in or out of modules to be considered with no knowledge
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of submodule implementation. Usually, these types of modules are at the bottom of the
hierarchy anyway, since they are often look-up-tables or implementations of some arithmetic
operations that would have a small impact on the overall design, and thus would be unlikely
to create a Trojan site that would appear in the upper ranking list. In some cases, however,
more complex components, such as JTAG testing networks, are implemented in this way.
Because JTAG interfaces are a known security issue, it will be important to consider these
components more completely in the future. Future work seeks to expand the reach of the
tool and bring more components of target designs into the analysis.
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Chapter 5
SCORING AND LOCATION SELECTION
In order to select interesting signals and logic for potential Trojans, analysis of high-level
Verilog constructs is necessary. To do this, a novel set of metrics was used not only to
understand the signals and statements within each Verilog module, but to also inform what
sorts of behavior modification Trojans could potentially be derived from them. A heuristic
based approach was developed to score each signal and logic statement according to concepts
of connectivity, type, size, and complexity.
5.1 Attacker Methodology and Location Types
To better understand how an attacker might go about manually inserting a Trojan, it was
important to consider the decision making process that a human attacker would go trough
when considering attacks against a design. The following was used as a model process for
how an attacker might go about selecting locations for inserting Trojans in a general sense.
This process only considers the placement of the payload, as trigger selection will likely
depend on the outcome of the payload insertion process and is outside the scope of this
thesis. That said, this process is not fixed, as any stages from those defined below could
easily be changed depending on the design or individual in question.
1. The attacker studies high level functionality of device components.
2. The attacker selects a module (or set of modules) to target for attack.
3. The attacker determines what type of effect a Trojan would implement.
4. The attacker inspects signals related to desired effects and selects a target signal.
5. The attacker finds a point in the circuit at which to inject malicious logic.
6. The attacker determines what logic to insert to achieve the desired goal.
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This work focuses mainly on steps three, four, and five. For the sake of this thesis, three
types of potential Trojan location were defined to approximate some of the potential options
an attacker may consider when considering what type of effect they desire in step three.
These three types of potential Trojan location are described simply as Destructive Locations,
locations that cause catastrophic effects on calculations, Intermittent Locations, locations
that create hard to pinpoint errors or “glitches”, and Interconnect Locations, locations that
could be used to interrupt communication between two or more submodules. In practice,
each location will be comprised of two components: a target signal and a target line of code
(statement). These two pieces of information define a site within a design that could be a
good site to insert a Trojan, and do so with enough specificity as to imply how a Trojan
payload could be implemented. These locations and the criteria used to identify them will
be described in more detail in later sections. While other types of locations are possible and
likely useful for full analysis of a design, this investigation was limited to these three, as they
lend themselves quite well to the study of Behavior Modifier Trojans specifically. Future
work will expand this list to include even more types of locations.
Using these three classifications of locations as a starting point, scoring and selection
processes were implemented to emulate the decisions made by an attacker in stages four and
five. The first scoring process will be used to select signals that are thought to be important
to a module’s functionality, approximating the selection process of step four. From this,
logic within a module can be evaluated to find locations that lend themselves to attacks
associated with each type of location.
5.2 Process Overview
To implement an algorithmic approach to identifying sites that are in line with the
types of locations described above, a process was developed to automatically analyze Verilog
using a set of metrics built around how a human might seek out Trojan locations manually.
This method relies heavily on a set of metrics defined to capture important features and
structures in RTL code that are good locations to place a hardware Trojan. This process is
















































Figure 5.1: Scoring and Selection Process
In the first stage, called signal scoring, the preprocessed and extracted RTL source code is
evaluated to find all signal lines, including wires, registers, and ports. These signals are then
evaluated using a novel set of metrics that capture connectivity and structure information.
These scores make it possible to evaluate the role of each signal within a module without
knowing its intended purpose. There are three main metrics calculated for each signal. Put
simply, these are Impact, a measurement of forward assignment (fan-out), Susceptibility, a
measurement of backward dependency (fan-in), and Controllability, a measurement of how
specifically targetable a signal’s assignment is terms of conditional structures around it.
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These metrics will be discussed in more detail in following sections.
The second stage, called signal selection, uses a set of selection criteria to identify optimal
signals within a module for further analysis. This selection is done by considering the metric
scores calculated in the first step in pairs by way of calculating a Pareto frontier using two
metrics that characterize one of several types of potential Trojan location. This allows for an
intelligent selection of signals within a module that will likely lend themselves to a specific
type of attack, e.g. the metrics describing maximum Impact and maximum Controllability
could be used to identify Highly Destructive signals. The selection process will create a
subset of all signals in a module for each of the three types of location being investigated
and report them to the next stage.
The third stage is quite similar to the first stage, but this scoring process focuses on
the contents of the Verilog logic itself, calculating metrics based on the contents of each
statement. These metrics are similar to the signal scoring metrics in the first stage, but they
seek to capture functional information about the operators used to conduct calculations
rather than signal connection information. To reduce the amount of work necessary to
create a full ranking, only statements containing one of the signals selected in stage two
will be considered in this scoring step. Two metrics are calculated here: Complexity, a
measurement of how much gate level logic might be necessary to implement a line of RTL
code, and Reachability, a measurement of how difficult it would be to reach specific lines of
RTL during operation. The results of this stage will be passed to the final stage of selection.
The fourth stage, statement selection, will use the metrics from statement scoring to
select specific locations (lines of Verilog source code). This process will also use a Pareto
selection approach, where applicable (Interconnect locations do not use a Pareto selection),
to balance the two metrics used to find locations lending themselves to the types of locations
being investigated. At the end of this stage, a ranked list of potential locations of each type
is created for each module.
Once a set of potential locations has been created for each type of location in each
module, a ranking is constructed using information from every module in a design. To
create an ordered ranking, it is necessary to weigh the final ranked signals and statements
using a composite score (calculated during the selection process as the hypotenuse of the
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two metrics used in Pareto selection) in order to consider only a one dimensional value in
ranking creation. This ranking stage will select the top locations of each type from each
module and aggregate them into lists for output to the user.
The following sections will address these metrics and selection processes in further detail.
5.3 Signal Scoring
Signal selection begins by creating a comprehensive list of signals contained within a
module. This list will serve as the search space for Trojan payloads, as the selection of a
signal for attack will determine most of the Trojan’s potential functionality. Once all signals
have been discovered and the connectivity between them extracted, they will undergo two
rounds of scoring and a round of selection. In the first scoring round, signals will be assigned
an initial score based purely on their signal definitions. This will serve as the basis for all
scores derived in the second round. The second round scores of a signal are all calculated as
a function of the initial signals around it, as connectivity is used to understand the signals
relative to one another.
With all of the base metrics completed for each signal within a module, signal selection
can now begin. In this thesis, three different types of potential Trojan signals are evaluated.
Each of these groups is formed from an optimal selection using two of the base metrics from
the scoring stage. This allows for a more diverse sampling of the circuit and helps discover
interesting features of the module.
5.3.1 Base Signal Metrics
In the scoring stage, each signal will be evaluated based on its definition and usage within
the module. Since this method evaluates code at the register-transfer-level (RTL), there are
many synthesis-specific concepts that cannot be used for context. This means that this
analysis will be more abstract than what might be available in a gate-level method. That
said, it is believed that because this is the interface that an adversary inserting Trojans at
the RTL would be using, high level understanding of signal function would be more useful
than gate specific information. These metrics are intended to measure both the connectivity
and structure of the the RTL description provided. Here, connectivity refers to the over-
all interconnection of signals through assignments, while structure takes into account the
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conditional logic used to decide under what conditions assignments take place.
5.3.1.1 Initial Weight
To begin, signals must be given an initial weight estimate to measure their importance
when compared to other signals within a module. This value will be comprised of only infor-
mation contained within each signal’s definition, as assigning value to a signal’s connectivity
without some basic concept of its importance would be difficult. For the sake of this discus-
sion, this initial value score will be created automatically, although future investigation may
take user assigned initial values into account.
The initial score for signal a is defined as:
ainitial = aport_type_score + asignal_type_score + asize_score
Where aport_type_score is a value selected based on the port type of a, such as input and
outputs. More estimated importance is given to inputs and outputs, as they are often the
most vulnerable components of a module for attack. The asignal_type_score is a value assigned
based on the type of signal a represents, be it a wire or register. Here, registers are given
more estimated importance, as they can hold state and may have impacts over several cycles.
The size_score of a is used to estimate the importance of a single bit within a signal, as
busses are often used in data paths, but single bits are used for control values. This means
that while a signal may be comparatively large (for example 64 bits), designers will likely
separate out more important signals into their own single bit line. This score is normalized





Where max_score = 2 and max_size is set to the width of the largest signal in the same
module as a. A full enumeration of the values used to assign this initial score are available
in Table 5.1.
Consider the following signal definitions:
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Port Type Value Signal Type Value Signal Size Value
input 2 Wire 1 1 Bit 2
output 2 Register 3 Max 0
inout 3
internal 1






With the method described, each of these would be evaluated based on port type, signal
type, and size, giving the scores found in Table 5.2. Here it is clear that the inputs, outputs,
and registers usually score higher than other internal components even when accounting for
size. This operates on the assumption that control-path signals are usually more important







Table 5.2: Example Initial score values.
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5.3.1.2 Impact
It is necessary to understand the potential influence a signal has on other signals in a
module. This is done using a metric referred to as impact, which gives higher scores to
signals that have a large amount of total fan-out. This score is calculated as the sum of all
the initial scores of signals that are influenced by a given signal. The impact score for each
signal is defined as follows:




Where F is the set of all l many module signals that are influenced by signal a through
forward assignment, Fi specifies a specific signal in the set, and Fi, initial indicates that the
initial score of element i is being considered. The cycle_multiplier is a scalar used to adjust
based on circular dependencies used in state dependent calculations. This encompasses all
signals within a module that are downstream of signal a to the outputs. Impact gives a
numerical representation of how much of the module’s state is tied to signal a and allows for
a simple estimation of the impact a signal has on the entire module when changed. Higher
scores indicate that a signal has more influence than other signals.
To account for the effects of feedback loops such as state-machine logic or accumulators,
the impact score sum is scaled up by a multiplier. This multiplier exists in a range between
1.0 and 1.5 and is defined as:
cycle_multiplier = 1.0 + 0.5 ∗ 1.0
shortest_cycle
Where the shortest_cycle is the smallest number of forward assignments necessary to
create a cycle within the connectivity graph. In most cases, the distance will be one as
most state registers and accumulators often directly assign to themselves with minor some
calculations, although there are some occasions were two or more assignments take place
before a cycle is completed.
35
5.3.1.3 Susceptibility
In addition to the impact, it is also useful to measure how a signal is affected by other
signals within a module. Due to this, a metric called susceptibility can be calculated from
a signal’s list of influencing signals. That is, susceptibility is derived from the full list of
signals that influence signal a. This is similar to impact, but works in the opposite direction.
Susceptibility is defined as:




Where B is the set of all m module signals that influence a given signal a through
backward assignment (signal assignment l.h.s. and r.h.s. are inverted). Here, Bj identifies
an element of signals and Bj, initial refers specifically to the initial score of that element.
Like impact, this score is a measure of connectivity relative to the initial scores of other
signals, although it is a measurement of how important the signals used to create the final
assignment of a signal a are, rather than its forward implications. Susceptibility seeks to
quantify a signals total fan-in. Higher scores indicate that a signal has more dependency
on other signals and that it is likely the result of a more complex calculation and larger
upstream cone of influence.
In this instance, the value of cycle_multiplier is defined in the same way as it is for
impact, as the distance necessary for a forward cycle is the same as the distance used for the
same reverse cycle.
5.3.1.4 Controllability
Since Verilog designs are usually heavily based on conditional logic, it is also necessary
to quantify the control structure implications of the design. For the sake of signal scoring,
this is measured by a metric called controllability. This is not to be confused with the
traditional concept of controllability used in test pattern generation and fault list selection.
Here, controllability is another summed score taken over the signals that are involved in
the conditional statements used to reach a specific signal. However, these do not include
the signals used in the assignments themselves. The weights of signals directly controlling
a conditional statement before the target signal’s assignment will be normalized against the
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total of all signals that have any conditional influence in a signal’s assignment. This seeks to
better understand how specifically controllable a signal is. This is a somewhat naive method,
as it uses all control statements that affect a signal simultaneously. That said, this issue is






Where D is the set of n signals directly involved in a conditional statement directly
around specific assignments of signal a, and C is the total set of all p signals that influence
any conditionals that affect a.
5.3.2 Signal Selection
This discussion will investigate three classifications of potential Trojan signal targets:
Highly Destructive Signals, Intermittent Effect Signals, and Interconnect Signals.
In order to select the best signals of each type for a module, two criteria are used to
select the Pareto optimal subset of signals based on the two metrics. Put simply, a Pareto
optimal selection of data points (sometimes called the Pareto frontier, or Pareto efficient
points) are the outermost points on a sample of data that represent the extremes of at least
two dimensions defining the point. Using the Pareto optimal set ensures that both metrics
are being considered and no one extreme of a data point is used as the selection criterion.
This serves two purposes: one, that the signals selected are of the best representation of both
metrics, and two, that that signals selected are diverse and encompass a more inclusive subset
than what is possible from using only one metric to select target signals. Many of the other
categories of signals and statements used later will rely on this method of selection. Once the
optimal subset of signals is selected, the two metrics used to select them will be combined
into a composite score by way of the Euclidean distance between the scores represented on
perpendicular axes, similar to calculating the hypotenuse of a right triangle. This allows for
a relative ranking to be constructed in such a way that signals that are high in both metrics
are rewarded but signals with only one high score are still allowed to compete.
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5.3.2.1 Highly Destructive Signals
Highly destructive signals are those that are assumed to have a large impact if altered,
potentially destroying all module functionality. Signals in this category are usually associated
with many other signals through assignment or have controlling characteristics over some
of the most heavily weighted initial scores within a module. This means that they are
likely to have a high impact score. In order for these signals to have their potentially
destructive nature, they must also be assigned often or be easy to reach in the conditional
logic of the module. This means that highly destructive signals will be within the code
blocks evaluated most often due to the nature of their controlling conditional logic, which
is approximated by the controllability metric of that signal. If an attacker’s intention is to
destroy as much a circuit’s functionality as possible, signals of this type are likely targets
because their corruption will have catastrophic effects on other signals.
5.3.2.2 Intermittent Effect Signals
The attacker’s goal in inserting a behavior modifier Trojan into a design is unknown, so it
is important to consider multiple avenues of attack. While one might assume that the most
destructive approach is an obvious choice, creating intermittent issues within a design can
be very damaging. In order to consider signals that could be used for this method of attack,
the tool considers a second type of signal classification called an intermittent effect signal.
These signals are expected to be those that are rarely used or that are meant to manage edge
cases in normal operations. As such, alterations to their correct values should only be felt
in certain instances, making their appearance harder to detect from a functional observation
standpoint. To select these automatically, signal scores are optimally selected based on the
minimum impact, so as to keep effects small, and on minimum signal controllability, to
ensure that the actual site for Trojan insertion is in a hard to reach block within the logic.
5.3.2.3 Interconnect Signals
Since the module-based structure of most Verilog designs lends itself to hierarchical or-
ganization, it was also necessary to investigate module interconnects as potential sites for
Trojan insertion. This was done with the introduction of a third category of signal that was
liable to attack, called interconnect signals. These signals are found in high-level modules
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that describe some sort of routing between submodules instantiated inside themselves. Sim-
ply, interconnect signals are sites within a module where a high valued submodule output is
wired into another high valued submodule input. To find the most interesting interconnect
signals, the tool constructs a set of submodule signal routing pairs and evaluates specific
output to input combinations that have the highest scores. Unlike destructive and inter-
mittent behavior modification signals, interconnect signals are selected using information
from two connected sub-modules and are not selected optimally in the same way. Instead,
a compound score is taken for each pairing and added to a sorted ranking list. When final
selection occurs, the top n elements of this list can be selected for further consideration.
Highly Destructive Intermittent Effect Connectivity
Criteria 1 Max Impact Min Impact High Output Suscept.
Criteria 2 Max Controlability Min Controllability High Input Impact
Table 5.3: Criteria used for signal selection by type.
After the initial scoring stage is complete, each module’s signals are evaluated based on
the category definitions defined above. Through this process, signals of each type may not
be found in a every module. Overall, this step is to inform the user and later stages of
processing which signals should be investigated further, by calculating and comparing the
heuristics used to give them their rankings. From the results of signal selection, the process
of finding the most interesting and dangerous lines of logic in the design source code can
begin.
5.4 Statement Scoring
Much of Verilog’s usefulness for RTL specification comes from its high-level conditional
constructs. These constructs, such as IF statements and CASE statements, allow designers
to implement robust logic structures without needing to specify every gate of a design. By
making this level of abstraction available, designers can save time in the design process, as
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well as create more human readable descriptions of logic functionality. It is then expected
that synthesis tools convert this high-level description into a gate-level representation through
synthesis, so that the design can be implemented. There are many components necessary
to preform this translation from high to low abstraction, so opportunities for ambiguous or
dangerously specified lines of source code to manifest into design issues are often masked by
the synthesis tool’s inherent complexity or the complexity of the final realization of the initial
description. For Trojans inserted at the RTL, this gives an attacker the opportunity to insert
small changes in source code that have hidden effects due to the details of the synthesis tool
or any implementation specific design rules. This, among other considerations, will be used
to score and rank the statements that comprise module functionality for potential Trojan
sites.
5.4.1 Base Statement Metrics
For the purposes of this investigation, it becomes necessary to evaluate circuit logic
through the lens of high abstraction, since there is no gate-level representation of the design
available to our tool. As a result, selecting lines of source code to investigate for potential
Trojan locations must rely on high-level concepts that are inherently related to how signals
are assigned within the RTL domain. This is accomplished using a set of metrics calculated
for each statement of Verilog code that implements some sort of logical functionality. This
primarily includes assignments and conditional structures. While submodule instantiations
are important for evaluating the interconnection of signals within a module, they do not
directly provide more information on what those signals are for or how logic elements are
specified.
5.4.1.1 Complexity
One of the most directly accessible and apparent metrics that can be used to describe an
expression in Verilog is some measurement of complexity. Here, complexity is thought of as an
estimation of potential gate count for an expression’s gate-level representation after synthesis.
This enables a context-aware evaluation of high-level operations that takes into account an
estimated amount of low-level logic necessary for gate-level implementation. Since the gates
available in a cell library used to implement a design and the exact synthesis techniques used
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to create complex operators are not known to this analysis, rough approximations based on
non-optimized circuit patterns are used as a conservative estimate of operator complexity.
Operator Gate-Count Approx.















Table 5.4: Examples of operator complexity estimation functions based on bit width (n).
To evaluate an entire line using this method, all operators are parsed out and stored for
processing. The operators are then iterated over, evaluating each of their complexities based
on the size of n, the number of bits in the output, according to rules for approximating
gate count created for this application. Some examples of these rules are listed in Table 5.4.
Single operator scores are totaled and reported as the complete score for that statement.





Where O is the set of all m operator symbols found within statement s and n is the
width of the largest signal involved in that statement. The function Complex(Oi, n) returns
the value of the expression for gate count approximation depicted in Table 5.4 evaluated for
that specific n.
5.4.1.2 Conditional Leaning
While it is impossible to know the values certain signals are likely to hold during operation
without simulation data, it is possible to make educated guesses as to how often certain
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conditional blocks are evaluated. This is estimated through a metric called conditional
leaning. All conditional constructs result in one of two outcomes: either the logic with a
conditional block is executed, or it is not. How conditional logic like this is synthesized
into gate-level implementations may greatly vary from design to design and synthesis tool
to synthesis tool. However, the designer does give some information about how decisions
are made at a high level. Because this approach assumes no additional information about
signal values, it is hard to know with certainty if specific conditional blocks are evaluated
more frequently. Despite this, if it is assumed that all signals can take on any value and do
so with equal probability, we can study how the operations used in a conditional block can
potentially bias the outcome in one way or the other.
The simplest example of this is any basic two input logic gate. Take, for example, an
AND gate with two inputs whose values can be 0 or 1 with equal probability. If many
trials were attempted where the output of this gate was measured given random inputs, it
would have a tendency toward 0 with a split of 25% to 1 and 75% to 0 as more trials were
attempted. Table 5.5 shows how this is a function of the truth table of an operation and






Table 5.5: Outcome bias of a 2-input AND gate with equal probability inputs with three
zeros and one one.
This concept can be applied to all two-input gates as well as all logical and relational
operators. For instance, consider the equality operator. In a two input, one bit case, this
can be implemented with a single XOR gate. As the inputs get larger however the equality
operator’s implementation grows more complex and the likelihood of two signals having the
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same value decreases significantly, as only a small number of conditions will satisfy equality
but 22n total input combinations exist, if each of the two inputs is of size n. Here, equality
is only met when two n bit wide values are exactly the same, meaning that only 2n of the
total 22n input combinations yield true. Since it is impossible to know exactly what the bias
of each of each large operator is, they can only be classified generally. Examples of these
operators and their assumed effects can be seen in Table 5.6.










Table 5.6: Operators in Conditionals with bias toward 1 or 0.
Similar to the calculation of statement complexity above, a score can be given to a whole
statement by considering all the operators that make it up. This is done by iterating over
the operators used within a conditional and evaluating each of their bias’. It would not be
fair to consider an exact probability of any sort, but the conditional leaning can be captured
in a value between 1.0 and 0.0, where statements closer to 1.0 are expected to commonly
evaluate as true, leanings toward 0.0 are expected to be commonly false, and values at 0.5
are split equally. Each statement is assigned a score of 0.25, 0.5, or 0.75 depending on its
estimated leaning during this step.
Since these leaning scores are designed to describe conditional statements, it is important
to also consider the effect of conditional block structure for not just IF statements, but for
those with multiple components, such as ELSE and ELSE IF statements. In the simple
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case of an IF statement with a trailing ELSE statement, the conditional leaning calculated
for the IF condition can be complemented (subtracted from 1.0) and assigned to the ELSE
statement. More complex rules are necessary to assign values to each component of a chain
of IF, ELSE IF, and ELSE statements, as the result of the previous block must be used when
evaluating the current block.
Consider the following logic:






In this example, block 1 is evaluated if the value of both a and b are 1. This means that
this block would have a conditional leaning toward 0 and would be assigned a score of 0.25.
Since the ELSE statement defines the behavior should the test of the IF fail, block 2 will
be evaluated only when the IF statement is not true. In this case the leaning of the ELSE
statement would account for any misses by the IF statement and would tend toward being
evaluated more often (toward 1.0). The contents of the ELSE block would be assigned a
score of 0.75 as that is the remaining probability. Again, this metric does not seek to assign
any direct estimate of the probability a statement is true, as its purpose is more to give a
relative measure of how often logic within a conditional might be evaluated. This type of
approach is also necessary for managing CASE statements, which have a very similar effect.
It is understood that this is a naive approach, as the characteristics of the input variables
used in conditionals will often not match the fifty-fifty assumption used here. Future work
will look toward more accurately representing these characteristics in this calculation to
account for more true-to-life evaluation.
5.4.1.3 Reachability
By its definition, the conditional leaning of a conditional statement only applies to the
outcome of that specific statement. To expand upon this and understand an entire module’s
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flow, the metric of reachability was created. This is a metric defined for all lines of functional
logic (assignments and conditionals) within a module, as it seeks to quantify how often each
line of logic is evaluated. It is an extension of conditional leaning, but it uses the tree-like
structure of conditional statements to assign a score to every level of nested structure and
the statements within them. It is calculated by traversing the logic tree and taking a product
of all conditional leaning scores along a path from the root of the design (the outermost logic
such as ALWAYS statements and continuous assignments) to a given node (any internal
statement within control structures).
Consider the following logic:
if (a || b) begin // Conditional 1
if (c) begin // Conditional 2
x = 1; // Assignment 1
end
else // Conditional 2 (ELSE)
x = 2; // Assignment 2
end
else // Conditional 1 (ELSE)
x = 3; // Assignment 3
if (c && d) begin // Conditional 3
y = 1; // Assignment 4
end
end
Where a, b, and c are single bit signals.
This logic structure can be represented as a simple logical tree, where statements that
are parallel (within the same level of nesting) are considered to have the same reachability.
Whenever there is a conditional statement, the reachability of the current level is multiplied
by the conditional leaning of that statement and used for all children within that conditional
statement’s control. This can be seen in Figure 5.2, where the conditional leaning of control
statements is shown in [] and statement reachability is show in {}. Notice that the reacha-
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bility scores for nodes A3 and C3 are identical. This is because they are at the same level
(within the outermost ELSE block). Reachability only changes when entering a conditional
block. By default, the top-most statements without higher control structures are given a
Reachability of 1.0.
C1: (a||b)[.75]{1.0}
C2: (c) [.5] {.75} A3: x = 0 {.25}
C3: (c && d) [.25] {.25}A1: x = 1 {.375} A2: x = 0 {.375}




Figure 5.2: Example logical graph of simple conditional code with Conditional Leaning and
Reachability scores.





Where L is the set of all n conditional logic statements that enclose a statement s. In
the example listed above, the set L of statement A2 would be {C1, C2} and would have a
reachability score of 0.75 ∗ 0.75 = 0.375.
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5.4.2 Statement and Location Selection
Similar to the categorization of signals in 5.3.2, statements can be categorized similarly
into three parallel classes. In fact, in order to select statements for investigation, the signals
selected earlier will serve as a starting point for the statement selection process. This is
because even though there may be statements that are inherently interesting based on the
metrics defined above, they are of little use if they are not in some way involved with a
interesting signal from section 5.3.2. To begin statement selection, statements within a
module are searched for based on their relationship to a signal of interest. With this subset
of statements selected, they are then ranked based on the metrics related to each type of
signal.
It is important to note that this method will determine a line of code that can be used
to alter a target signal. This means that once a line is found to be interesting, any edits to
this statement or values going into it will be potential Trojan sites. Additionally, locations
downstream of this location could also be potential Trojan locations. For the sake of this
thesis however, these potential locations will not be evaluated, as their impacts will likely
be similar to the original location identified.
5.4.2.1 Highly Destructive Assignments
Highly destructive assignments are statements that are assumed to have catastrophic ef-
fects if tampered with. This means that small changes in input signals or clever replacements
of operators (such as switching a ’«’ (Left Shift) with a ’«<’ (Arithmetic Left Shift)) could
result in large changes in the value they assign to a target signal. To understand what a
statement of this type looks like, consider first arithmetic operations. As noted in 5.4.1.1,
arithmetic operations will likely synthesize into a large number of gates using library com-
ponents or external IP. If an attacker is clever, knowing the details of this implementation
might allow a seemingly innocuous change to have significant effects in certain situations.
From this, it is reasonable to infer that the higher complexity of a statement allows for bet-
ter concealment of malicious changes. Additionally, the attacker will likely want to create
as much damage as possible in one of these situations, so choosing logic that is used often
is likely desirable as well. For these reasons, statements of this type are selected using the
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efficient Pareto front created from maximal assignment complexity and maximal reachability.
5.4.2.2 Intermittent Effect Assignments
Contrary to the objectives of a highly destructive signals and assignments, intermittent
effect signals and assignments should cause issues infrequently or only in certain conditions.
In order to ensure that Trojan injection is harder to detect, it is still necessary that the
complexity of the target assignment is high; however, it is probable that lower reachability
is desired. Together, these help guarantee that a Trojan will have more sporadic effects
(assuming it does not completely break the logic), leading to reliability issues or degradation
in performance and accuracy. Great care must be taken to evaluate edge cases during testing
if this type of Trojan is to be detected. This is a common issue in design verification, to
approaches for finding and studying corner cases used in verification will likely be usefull for
evaluation Trojan locations of this type.
5.4.2.3 Interconnect Selection
Unlike the previous two types of RTL Trojan locations, interconnection logic does not rely
on assignments or conditionals. As such, the definition of a signal that is used to connect two
submodules within a larger module will be marked as the location for Trojan insertion. This
leaves it up to the user to decide how they would like to interfere with the interconnection.
Locations of this type open the door for many types of attack, both within the module they
are identified in, as well as in the submodules they connect. As such, attacks on the selected
output, input, and the connecting signal should be considered.
5.5 Final Ranking
Until this point, all analysis has been conducted on a per module basis. In order to provide
a useful report to the user, it is necessary that the most dangerous locations in the designs
are selected in an intelligent way. To do this, the top scoring locations (based on composite
scores) of each type are selected and placed into a universal ranking that considers the entire
design. This creates the issue of comparing the threat of one Trojan location in a given
module with a different Trojan location in another module. For the sake of simplicity, the
composite scores from the last stage are evaluated on a logarithmic scale by default, as scores
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from different modules differ greatly in magnitude as they are not normalized against each
other in any way. Since this function is monotonic, it will not change the order of the ranked
locations, but only reduce the scores in magnitude. This keeps the user from assuming that
large differences between scores are deeply meaningful and keeps scores smaller and more
directly comparable. The goal of this tool is to rank potential Trojan locations rather than
give concrete numerical analysis. It should be noted then, that the exact numerical value of
each score is arbitrary and should only be used to compare locations within the same design.
A round robin approach is used to help maintain good diversity in the final set of selected
locations. This is done by taking the maximum scoring location from the design and then
locking that module’s locations out for the following rounds. The next location selected must
come from a different module, which is then also locked out. This continues until a location
is selected from every available module; then the locked out modules are released and the
process begins again. Without this process, certain modules with a large amount of internal
signals or logic will completely dominate the list, keeping smaller or simpler modules from
ever being reported. A process similar to this is also run in the per module location selection
stage to ensure that not every location is associated with the same signal.
5.5.1 Global Ranking
To find the locations that cause the most concern, the user might be interested in seeing
which locations within the design are scored the highest. The tool can then select n many
of the top most locations for each category. Using the selection approach listed above, all
locations within the entire design are positioned in one, global ranking for each category.
This ranking will place locations that have the highest composite scores, and are thus as-
sumed to be the most likely or dangerous locations for a Trojan, at the top of the list, with
other locations of lessening scores placed in descending order below. From this, a report
is generated that describes every location selected, as well as its score and some pertinent
information about the module it is in and the signal that it targets.
5.5.2 Height Ranking
The kinds of modules used to create a design will vary in composition from the top module
down to the bottom of the design hierarchy. At the top of the design hierarchy, modules are
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usually very abstract and are used to instantiate and connect numerous submodules. Should
one follow a path from the top module down the lowest submodule, module composition will
become more and more specific, transitioning from mostly submodule instances to conditional
and sequential logic or data tables. Because of the different purposes of modules found at
different levels within the design hierarchy, it is also useful to create design level rankings
based on the ‘height’ of modules. Here, height is a measure of how many levels of submodule
exist below a module’s definition. So, a module that has no submodules within itself would
have a height of zero, and the top module would have the maximum possible height for that
design. Creating the height-wise rankings is essentially the same processes as creating the
global ranking; however, only the modules in each height grouping are considered at a time,
and each group is considered a separate global ranking for that height. This type of ranking is
mostly useful for small designs where differences in module purpose are obvious. As designs
increase in size and complexity, this type of ranking becomes less useful, as some branches
of the hierarchy tree will be significantly longer than others, disrupting the usefulness of this
type of this ranking. In general, this ranking can be interesting for manually evaluating the
types locations being identified in different types of modules, but its results are very similar




To evaluate the effectiveness of the previously described ranking approach, several exper-
iments were conducted. Two designs were processed using the tool-flow and scoring system
described in Chapters 4 and 5. These designs range in size from a small 16-bit MIPS pro-
cessor to a navigation control system implemented using several internal communication
protocols. These designs were processed mostly as is, but minor changes to the source code
were necessary to meet some of the limitations detailed in Section 4.5.
6.1 16-Bit MIPS Processor
To validate that the tool was able to process designs and locate interesting signals and
locations, it was first used to evaluate a simple 16-Bit MIPS processor [25]. This design was
selected for its simple structure and small size so that the selections made by the tool would
be easy to understand and validate by hand. The goal here was to ensure that the tool was
finding the types of signals and locations that were expected to score highly according to
the metrics defined in Section 5 and verify that the details critical to the designs were being
properly extracted. This discussion will assume some basic knowledge of the MIPS processor
architecture at a high-level.
To evaluate this design, the top twenty locations of each of the three types listed in
Section 5.4.2 were identified by the tool and then and investigated by hand. Since this
design is small, several locations using the same signal were selected when creating the top-
ten rankings. Here, only a few unique locations will be discussed in detail, but the full
top-ten rankings are available in Appendix A.1.
6.1.1 Destructive Locations
From the analysis, the signal pc from the instruction fetch stage was selected as a danger-
ous signal, and its specific assignment on line 37 was deemed the most destructive location
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Type Rank Module Signal Location Line
Destructive 1 IF_stage pc 37
2 alu r 38
8 WB_stage reg_write_data 39
Intermittent 1 ID_stage ex_alu_cmd 203
2 register_file reg_write_dest 54
12 EX_stage pipeline_reg_out 52
Interconnect 1 mips_16_core_top ID_pipeline_reg_out 29
2 mips_16_core_top instruction 28
3 mips_16_core_top decoding_op_src2 38
Table 6.1: Overview of unique locations in 16-Bit MIPS Processor
in the design. Those familiar with most processor designs will immediately recognize this
signal as the program counter, a core component used to keep machine state and determine
program execution order. It is understandable that this signal would be a good target for a
destructive Trojan, as any alteration to the value of pc would cause incorrect instructions to
be fetched or could allow malicious code from other blocks of memory to be executed. The
line that was selected as a potential Trojan site in the source code is as follows [25]:
pc <= pc + {{(‘PC_WIDTH-6){branch_offset_imm[5]}}, branch_offset_imm[5:0]};
This statement is used to calculate the next value of the program counter using a branch
offset to jump to another location within the instruction memory. Unlike the standard update
of the program counter (stepping forward one memory address), this calculation allows for a
relative branching increment to be added to the program counter. Attacks at this location
could be implemented by changing the branch offset (thus moving to an unintended location),
stopping the update from occurring by removing the offset, or completely overwriting pc.
This specific line was selected for its high complexity. Even though the ‘+’ (addition)
operator is used in other lines of this module, the use of the ‘(){}’ (replication) and ‘{}’
(concatenation) operators add to the statement’s complexity. Therefore, it would be easier
to insert hard to detect changes within this line.
Another destructive location was identified within the arithmetic logic unit (ALU). Since
this module is the center for all complex operations within this circuit, it is reasonable that
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the result of computation (signal r) was selected as a highly-destructive location. Specifically,
the contents of line 38 were targeted, where the shift right operation is conducted:
r = {{16{a[15]}},a} >> b;
Shifting operations require a fair amount of logic to implement, so they are associated with
a relatively high complexity score. Within this device, both a shift right signed and a shift
right unsigned operation are implemented. Since the shift right signed operation requires an
extension of the sign bit, it is slightly more complex than the shift right unsigned operation.
Attacks on this line could include altering the shift amount, injecting sign extension errors,
or using the ‘>>>’ (arithmetic shift) operator in place of the other implementation (simple
shift with manual sign bit extension), potentially changing the circuit depending on synthesis
details.
Several other locations for attacks on pc and r make up many of the top locations in
the ranking. Moving down to the eighth position, the tool identifies an attack on signal
reg_write_data within the write-back stage. This signal is the value assigned to a register
when write-back operations take place. While this signal does not branch out much within
this module, its impact on the register state could have negative impact on later calculations
or allow for unexpected edits to memory. This specific assignment is implemented using the
Verilog ternary operator, which is usually synthesized into a multiplexer whose control is
tied to the outcome of a conditional statement:
reg_write_data = (write_back_result_mux)? mem_read_data : ex_alu_result;
In this case, the signal being written to the register file is assigned to one of two input
signal that are selected by a single bit control value. Attacks here could include forcing
data read from memory to be written into the registers unintentionally or clearing register
contents.
6.1.2 Intermittent Locations
When considering intermittent locations, it is important to remember that these sites
are selected using the inverse, or lowest, reachability used in selecting destructive locations.
This serves the purpose of making circuit behavior unpredictable or “glitchy” after the Trojan
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is triggered, making it harder to detect and diagnose. This means that relative to the
destructive locations, the statements selected here are expected to be evaluated less often
and are commonly within multiple levels of nested conditional logic.
The first signal selected for possible intermittent locations is the ex_alu_cmd signal
found within the instruction decode stage of the pipeline. In fact, this signal makes up
most of the top ten rankings, as it is assigned in various locations throughout this module
(once for each possible ALU operation). This means that the specific line number for this
location is not too critical, as several sites could be investigated. What is important is that
this signal’s value is later used to control the ALU’s output function after being stored in a
pipeline register. If this value were to be altered slightly in any statement in this module, say
to switch the execution of the signed shift and unsigned shift operators, it would likely be
difficult to pinpoint, as only specific conditions would cause an error to manifest and then only
once the Trojan was triggered. Additionally, because this signal’s value is not immediately
used for calculation (it must pass through the pipeline register), its effects would only be
measurable two cycles later when the result of the execution stage was incorrect.
The next location was identified within the register file, a set of registers used as a sort
of working memory within the pipeline. Here, the targeted signal, reg_write_dest, is used
as the location (index) for assignment of values within the register file, implemented as an
array of registers. It is immediately clear that changing this value could result in incorrect
assignments to the register file, causing a potential derailment of the intended program.
A third interesting location comes from the execution stage’s pipeline_reg_out signal. In
this implementation of the pipeline, many of the values from the previous stage (instruction
decode) are simply passed through the execution stage into the next pipeline register with
no change. Since these values are accessible within the execution stage, they can be altered
from within a module that should have no effect on them, which could have interesting
implications from the point of view of the attacker. Should an attacker want to edit or
disrupt values necessary to later stages, they could do so by editing values values of the
pipeline register assignment within a module that that is not directly related to the point
an error would manifest at later in the pipeline. It is interesting to note that this issue is
an artifact of architectural design choices. Had the signals necessary for each stage been
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separated out at a higher level (in the top module), modules would only have access to the
signals that are necessary for their functionality. This approach violates the principle of
least privilege [26], as unrelated components can potentially access information not critical
to their operation. While this concept is usually applied to users within an information
system, it can be applied here, as not every stage of the MIPS pipeline needs access to the
entire pipeline state. Better implementation of the least privilege policy could help reduce
the number of locations that make these kinds of attacks possible.
6.1.3 Interconnect Locations
Complex designs are usually made from a large number of modules assembled in a hi-
erarchy. This allows for good code reuse, as well as separating functionality into discrete
and separate components for high level specification. While useful to the design process,
this gives attackers the ability to study module functionality abstractly, meaning that im-
portant input and output signals can be selected based purely on their names and module
specifications. It is important to study how modules (submodules) are connected within
higher levels of the design hierarchy. Since this is a small design, there are only three levels
of hierarchy, and almost all submodule interconnection occurs within the top-level module.
Each of the interconnect signals identified are used to connect stages within the pipeline with
the exception of one used for hazard detection. Attacks on these locations could be simple
reassignments to other values, sporadic errors, or even the injection of specific values that
cause pre-determined outcomes, such as forcing the processor to stall indefinitely.
6.2 Navigation Controller
The goal of this approach is to locate many potential Trojan locations in a complex design
automatically, so it was necessary to verify its functionality on a full, multi-function design.
To test their tool, designers behind the aforementioned “Achilles” project (Section 2.2.1) also
created a device design (sometimes referred to as the golden model) that implements a full
control system for a simple navigation application, to use as a bench-marking circuit for
their product. This controller consists of components to interface with sensors, user input
peripherals, and motor controllers. To facilitate communication between these components,
it also contains extensive network of communication devices using various standards (such
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as SPI, UART, and AXI). The full details of the design are too large for the scope of this
discussion, but a high-level view of the design and its components is elaborated below. For
the sake of evaluation, the designers also implemented several hardware Trojans to evaluate
the performance of “Achilles” overall as well as the approach put forward in this work.
With access to some Trojan examples, it is possible to compare the results of the automatic
location analysis to what might be found in a compromised, real-world circuit. It should be
noted that the Trojan designs created for this system were developed by a different set of
engineers and did not include the primary creator of the metrics and algorithms described
in this thesis.
First, some important details of the design will be outlined and the device architecture
explained at a high level. Next, some details of the manually created Trojans will be briefly
explained to give context to their operation and give some insight into how this design
could be attacked. Finally, interesting locations found by the automated analysis will be
investigated and compared to hardware Trojans placed by hand. By comparing these two
sources of Trojan relevant design locations, the benefits and drawbacks of the automated
approach can be better understood.
6.2.1 Architecture
In order to emulate real-world applications, the navigational controller design was built to
control a variety of sensors and actuators as well as utilize a host of communication protocols.
This was done so that lessons learned while conducting analysis of this design could easily
map to other applications in the future that used similar technologies. To keep this setup true
to life, it was implemented on a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) field-programmable-gate-
array (FPGA) development board, so that it could be studied closely by the team working
on “Achilles” during all stages of development. This also allows different kinds of sensor data
to be collected and used in the detection and learning stages of the project mentioned in
Section 2.2.1. While this design does not have the massive scale of some modern FPGA
applications, it is complex enough to be a good proxy for some aspects of standard industry
and military designs. A high level diagram detailing these components is provided in Figure
6.1.
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Figure 6.1: Navigation controller high-level block diagram.
Since the goal of this design is to provide a sort of simulation of a real-world application,
several physical actuators and input devices are connected to the COTS board to make
a fully functioning system. This includes motors and servos for a “propeller” and “rudder”
controlled by pulse-width-modulated (PWM) signals generated by the FPGA logic. Location
information is provided by a discrete GPS module. A keyboard is connected to allow the
user to input GPS coordinates (to simulate an autopilot function), as well as a joystick
for manual control of motion components, such as a propeller and rudder. These elements
are all stitched together using the FPGA fabric and interfacing wrappers to manage device
specific control logic and inter-device communications. The chosen evaluation board also
includes an ARM Cortex A-9 processor that acts as the algorithmic center of the design. In
this processor, sensor data is converted into desired action commands sent to the actuator
peripherals. While each physical component requires a different type of direct interface
communication protocol (such as SPI, UART, PWM signals, or PSUART for USB), most
components are unified using the AXI bus protocol. This means that all sensor and motion
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data will move through the AXI protocol at some point.
For the sake of this experiment, only the programmable logic components of the design
were evaluated. This excludes the implementation of the ARM processor and its associated
memories as well as the physical actuators and sensors themselves. All logic for interfacing
with peripherals was included. Since the design source-code is not available for distribution,
some additional details will be provided about the selected signals and locations in later
sections and in Appendix A.3.
6.2.2 Hand Placed Trojans
Six Trojans with various triggers and payloads were developed to act as test cases for the
“Achilles” tool-chain. They were intentionally defined to have different triggering behaviors
and payload activities in order to ensure that a wide variety of different Trojan types could
be evaluated. It is important to note that all of these Trojans belong to either the behavior
modification or reliability impact categories. Since these two categories of Trojan often
implement their payloads in a similar way, their characteristics are in line with the objective
of the scoring system in Chapter 5. Details elaborating the specific activation characteristics
and effects of each Trojan can be found in Appendix A.4, and the approximate location of
each Trojan is shown in Figure 6.1 as yellow circles. Other Trojans are being developed for
this design but were not completed in time for this investigation (shown as white circles).
In general, these Trojans have three main effects on the system: lockout, reliability degra-
dation, or take-over. Trojans T1a and T5c inhibit the user’s ability to control parts of the
system directly by disabling functions or freezing internal signals in a certain state, making
certain controls unresponsive, or interfering with expected behavior. Trojans T1b and T5a
interfere with communication protocols, causing control information (PWM signals) or mes-
sages (SPI transmissions) to be corrupted, leading to reduced functionality or erroneous and
sporadic behavior. Finally, the Trojans T1c and T4a allow control of the system to be taken
over by an unexpected peripheral, such as an extra joystick connected to unused I/O pins
or though unused buttons built into the COTS evaluation board, allowing an outside source
to control the navigation system. With the exception of the take-over Trojans, all of these
Trojans are triggered using timers or internal state-machines, a notoriously difficult to find
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type of Trojan trigger. More information on these Trojans can be found in Appendix A.3.
6.2.3 Tool-Identified Trojan Locations
Similar to the analysis of the MIPS processor, unique locations that were automatically
identified from the navigation controller have been listed in Table 6.2 with the full listings of
each location type in Appendix A.3. Since this design is much larger, there is more variety
present in what modules were selected in the final round-robin process. With that in mind, it
is interesting to note that there are many similar signals, such as signal o_m0n_axi_rdata ,
which is present in many modules and makes up eight of the top twenty positions. This is due
in part to the fact that the interfacing modules in this design all have AXI bus connectivity
and must interact with the protocol accordingly. Since they are technically different signals,
however (each one is specific to the instance it is used in and each is assigned values based on
the components it interacts with), they must be considered separately. While some of these
duplicate signals are almost identical, slight variations in their usage could be interesting
locations to hide novel Trojans, so they not discarded. For the sake of this discussion, only
the top ranked signals from of each of these groups will be investigated.
Type Rank Module Signal Related Trojan
Destructive 1 axi_router r_axi_router_int-
_data
Novel
2 pwm_if r_active_time T5a, T5c
3 gps_if o_m0n_axi_rdata Novel
12 joystick_if r_spi_byte_cntr T1a, T1b
Intermittent 1 spi_if r_mosi_cpha0 T1b
3 gps_if o_m0n_axi_rresp Novel










Table 6.2: Overview of unique locations in Navigation Controller
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6.2.3.1 Destructive Locations
The highest rated destructive location, as well as several other identified locations, target
the AXI communication components as sites for potential Trojans. In the case of the top-
ranked location, a register within the axi_router module that stores the data present on the
bus was deemed most destructive. The axi_router module serves as the central bus and
arbitration module for all AXI communication within the design. The selected register is
an internal storage location that is written-to and read-from in each write or read operation
conducted by the peripheral devices. At this central location, data in this register will
be used for all communication transactions, and thus it will impact the operation of every
peripheral. This signal was selected because of its massive connectivity, as well as the complex
assignment statements used to update it. Attacks here could have catastrophic impacts, as
an attacker could disrupt all messages moving through the bus (causing a denial-of-service),
corrupt some messages (thus degrading reliability), or replace specific values with others (to
create take-over or behavior modification effects). While the tool did find a specific line to
alter this signal on, almost any point within this module is a good site to alter it. Since
this location is central, a clever attacker could use a Trojan here to impact almost every
behavior of the system from afar. No Trojan has been created to utilize this site, but it is
recommended that it be investigated further by the “Achilles” group. Locations identified
by the automatic analysis that have no counterpart in the hand placed Trojan group, such
as this one, are denoted as “novel” in Table 6.2.
The next three unique locations could all be used to disrupt communication protocols
in some other way. Position two in the ranking points to a location within the pwm_if
module that manages the creation of PWM signals for controlling servo motors. There are
two instances of this module within the design, one for controlling the rudder, and one for
controlling the propeller. The signal identified (r_active_time) is used to limit the amount
of time used for holding a PWM signal in the high or low state, thus determining the pulse
width of the signal sent to the servo. The specific location identified is a block of logic used
for bounds checking when new commands are received for motor control. Altering this value
would allow for erroneous PWM control signals, causing outward malfunctions of the servos.
This is closely related to the effects of Trojans T5a and T5c, which both force changes to
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the PWM signals by altering the timers used to toggle states.
The third ranked location, and many after it, target the values being written out to the
AXI bus during read operations by the AXI controller. Any edits to the o_m0n_axi_rdata
signal could be interpreted as providing false information to the host controller. This sort
of falsification could be used to confuse navigation algorithms (providing false GPS data) or
directly steer the rudder and propeller. Alternatively, blocking output could cause lockup of
the system. No hand-created Trojans for this site were identified, but these locations could
be used for a variety of attacks.
The fourth unique location, or the twelfth destructive location identified, is a site used in
managing the communication with the joystick peripheral via a SPI connection. This signal,
r_spi_byte_cntr, is used to keep track of the number of bytes transmitted or received during
a transaction with the SPI peripheral. Should it be blocked or altered, SPI transmissions
could be lost, leading to an overall decline in communication reliability, or in a complete
denial-of-service. This signal was exactly identified for use in Trojan T1a, and is tangentially
related to the reliability attack of Trojan T1b.
6.2.3.2 Intermittent Locations
As mentioned before, intermittent locations are well suited for reliability attacks, as their
effects should only appear some of the time. This means that within this design, several
control signals for communication protocols were identified as good sites for intermittent
behavior modification. The first of these is the r_mosi_cpha0 signal within the SPI interface
module. This signal is used in setting the phase of the data clock, or which clock edge SPI
data should be read on. Altering this could cause undefined behavior during transmission,
causing corrupted or dropped messages. This location is somewhat related to the attack
implemented in Trojan T1b, which also attacks SPI clocking behavior, although in a different
way. Several other locations identified in this category could be used for similar Trojans.
The third ranked location, as well as many others like it, target the o_m0n_axi_rresp
signal used by the AXI protocol. This signal is a response used during read operations to tell
the host controller if there is data to read and if that data is valid during control handshakes
between the AXI devices. Should it be altered, attackers could halt read operations by
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breaking handshakes and causing slowdown (if intermittently changed) or complete lockout
(if forced to a single value). Since this signal is used in every AXI connection, it is important
to understand how attacks in each module could manifest differently depending on the role
of each module.
Another interesting location is identified at the nineteenth position in the intermittent
ranking. While this location does not score as highly as others, it does present a well hidden
attack vector. The o_axi_router_rd_en is a simple control flag used to indicate that a
read operation is taking place within the AXI routing module. This signal is assumed to
toggle synchronously with the presence of data on the AXI bus, so if it were interfered with
or delayed, messages could be dropped or transactions could be slowed down.
6.2.3.3 Interconnect Locations
The final and most abstract locations found by the tool are the interconnects used by high
level modules to route signals between submodules. Since there is no concept of component
purpose available to the analysis tool, these signals are mostly selected to highlight what is
assumed to be the most important connection edges from module to module, making them
good pinch points for small Trojans that simply enable or disable signals. These locations
come mostly just as recommendations as to what signals to attack, as no combinational logic
is associated with them.
The first eleven interconnects identified occur in the ship_control_pl_wrapper module,
which contains almost all of the non-ARM processor logic in this design and is where almost
every interface module is instantiated. Again, the signals selected are all related to the AXI
bus, although the specific signals selected come in three main types. The first type is the
address used by the AXI controller to specify which device it will read from or write to. The
second type is an enable flag signal used to set the read or write mode of AXI transactions.
The final type is the actual data on the AXI bus, specifically write data being sent out to
peripherals. Each of these interconnect locations could be used to implement almost any
type of behavior modification Trojan, as small changes to any control flag value here could
disrupt communication or changes to write values could cause changes in outward behavior
in the peripherals.
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Another interesting interconnect signal is identified at ranking position twelve. Here, the
w_upm_mask signal is used to identify specific bits within messages that mark important
status information. This status information is used to trigger certain alarms within the AXI
routing components in the event of errors or if certain devices need priority handling. While
this mask value is relatively static, false triggering of alarm signals (achieved by altering
the mask) could be a good way to degrade device performance, causing cycles to be wasted
managing fake errors.
Most of the remaining locations (thirteen through nineteen) identified are used for the
ARM processor to peripheral device communications within each interface module. Specif-
ically, the signals identified are registers used to store information coming from the ARM
processor (denoted with esm_rdata) to a peripheral or used to store information going from
a peripheral to the processor (denoted with ism_rdata). Here, false information could be
fed into the processor (such as bad GPS coordinates), or commands from the processor
to peripheral ignored (such as ignoring the propeller halt command). These locations are
similar to the top destructive location in that alterations here do not directly disrupt com-
munication protocols, but affect the peripherals themselves more directly. This could allow
for the propagation of falsified data to other parts of the design, and thus more fine grained
targeting of effects.
6.3 Observations
Considering that this is an automated analysis that uses no prior knowledge of the design
to suggest locations for attacks, the results of these experiments are quite promising. In both
the MIPS processor and the navigational controller, the tool found useful locations for all
three types of Trojan location category. Additionally, the tool was able to find locations
that were at least similar to those selected by hand on the navigation controller, as well
as recommend several novel locations for potential Trojans. That said, there are some
important considerations that should be made as a result of the observations taken from
these experiments.
The first, and potentially most obvious, is that the heuristics strongly favor communi-
cation related components when evaluating all three location types. This is likely due to
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the large emphasis that the base signal heuristics (impact, susceptibility, and controllability)
place on the connectivity of signals. Since the signals and statements are selected to be
Pareto optimal, this means that either of the two base metrics in each selection can cause a
signal to dominate other. As a result, signals involved in communication will usually have
high impact scores, causing them to dominate many other signals. While this issue is not
too apparent in the MIPS processor, the navigation controller logic is composed of many
communication components, making it difficult for locations involved in calculation logic to
surface. It should be mentioned that much of the navigation controller’s logic is mainly for
communication and contains proportionally less computational logic, which also influenced
the results seen above.
One potential issue with this scheme also lies in the detection of duplicate signals that
serve more or less the same function in several modules. Since these signals are often awarded
similar (if not identical) scores, it is hard to know if one specific signal and location can be
selected to act as a representation of all similar sites. Future investigation will evaluate these
groups and determine if some sort of grouping system can be used to select the best of a set
of similar locations, breaking the ties in scoring that they create.
Another potential point of improvement could come from enforcing some sort of “signal
distance” metric to ensure that signals selected for the top rankings are not too close to one
another. In most designs, the movement of a Trojan a few gate levels forward or backward
from its position will not change its effects too much, so it is possible that at the RTL a
Trojan identified at one location would be observed as very similar to a Trojan inserted at
an assignment nearby in the upstream or downstream cone of influence. For this reason, it
may not be of benefit to select signals that are very close to one another, as Trojan effects in
that area may be the same. Selecting the better of two close locations could help to ensure
more variety and signal coverage in the rankings generated.
In general, the locations selected by this tool are quite useful, in that they find interesting
locations that usually have good value for creating novel Trojans. Overall, each selected site,
including those not described above but included in the appendix, points to a location that
would be a good point of insertion for a Trojan. That said, the user must still determine
how an attacker would be most likely to insert a Trojan along with its likely effects. While
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a brute force method for automatically inserting Trojan logic elements (malicious AND, OR
and MUX gates) into designs is being investigated, more work in this area will be necessary




Electronic device security is now a major concern for industrial, consumer, and military
applications, so it is necessary that new methods of securing products be developed. This
work offers an approach to automatically locate potentially vulnerable sites within a register-
transfer-level (RTL) hardware design before it is compiled into a gate netlist or implemented
in a physical system. This aims to enable researchers and designers to better understand
how designs could be exploited, as well as help enable investigation into how designs can
be hardened to attack. This approach will be included in a larger tool-chain, described in
Section 2.2.1, with the goal of creating an end-to-end solution for securing complex digital
designs.
7.1 Design Strategies
From these results, several lessons can be learned about design approaches and how
better RTL code could help increase the resilience of a design to Trojan insertion. While
none of the following concepts can guarantee that no Trojan can be placed within a design,
following some guidelines could help make Trojans difficult to insert or more obvious if they
are inserted.
7.1.1 Least Privilege Policy
Like in most information systems, it is important to consider what components of a system
need access to which pieces of information in order to function. While this is a standard
practice in information technology systems and most software packages [26], it is important
to consider the policy of least privilege at the hardware design level as well. An important
example of a violation of this policy was detailed in Section 6.1.2, where a Trojan location
was identified that would not have existed within this design had the designer adhered more
closely to this concept. Here, following some best practices from the field of cybersecurity
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can help to limit some of these unnecessary risks. In hardware design, this would likely
come in the form of strict module specifications that only allow module inputs and outputs
to interact with the bare minimum information necessary for that module’s functionality.
Following this practice could cause other side affects, however, since limiting information
flow in and out of modules would likely lead to a flattening of the design hierarchy into more
parallel modules within a top-level module. This would result in more interconnect signals
and more potential interconnect Trojan locations, so trade-offs in this area would need to be
considered.
Due to their nature, interconnect Trojans are likely easier to find, since their location
can be more easily predicted based on hierarchical structure alone. Should the approach
described here or one developed later be highly successful in locating interconnect Trojans,
it may be possible that changes in design practices like this could lead aid Trojan detection
approaches as well.
7.1.2 Interconnect Vulnerabilities
Designs that utilize modules with several connected submodules may benefit from extra
protections applied to the submodule interconnect signals, such as JTAG testing hardware
[27]. Placing instruments, such as JTAG scan cells, on these interconnects can offer two
potential deterrents for an attacker. First, the presence of a JTAG scan cell, or other sensor,
on an interconnection signal indicates that this signal will be monitored during testing, so
alterations to this signal could be easily detected. The drawback of this is that this does
indicate this signal is important to the attacker. Second, since JTAG scan cells require the
insertion of a register component, timing analysis will become more constrained in the area
around the cell. This means that some Trojans that include extra logic may violate timing
rules on a certain path, causing further investigation and potential discovery of the Trojan
by a designer later during verification stages. It should be noted that some Trojans can take




Clear and consistent coding practices can help any software product be more maintainable
and understandable, and the same is true of RTL code. With this comes the opportunity
for designers to notice deviations from design patterns or improperly specified components.
While the same practices used in software design may not be directly applicable to hardware
specification, some standards do exist to help with hardware code reuse and maintainability.
It is recommended that any entity concerned with hardware security utilize some standard
for the implementation of a design. One such example of this is the Reuse Methodology
Manual [28]. In the case of the navigation controller, standardized signal naming conventions
helped to identify groups of similar locations even when potential Trojan sites were discovered
in separate modules.
7.2 Closing Thoughts
There has been a fair amount of work on the Trojan detection problem; that is, many
methods used to identify Trojans already placed in a circuit have already been created and
evaluated. This previous work, discussed more in Chapter 3, provides some insight into how
Trojans have been located in the past and provides some lessons regarding how hardware
attacks can be conceptualized in practice. That said, most of this work is at the gate-
level and relies on the strict rules available to low-level abstractions. For the analysis tool
presented in this thesis, new methods that relied only on RTL code needed to be developed.
From the experiments presented in Chapter 6, it is clear that automatic identification of
potential behavior modification Trojan sites is not only possible but quite useful for analyzing
designs. The approach presented here is capable of identifying three major classifications of
potential Trojan locations based an a set of base metrics derived from the source code of
the RTL design, as described in Chapter 5. Using these metrics to first identify interesting
signals to target, the tool gains some understanding of how signals are used within the
design with no prior knowledge of the purpose of each component. Once selected, these
signals are investigated further, where specific lines pertaining to them in the source code
are selected based on a separate set of metrics to describe how dangerous a statement would
be in a specific context. Together, these two steps enable the creation of a design level set
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of rankings that can quickly identify and partially describe what kinds of attack are best
suited for interesting locations. While this tool does not provide suggestions regarding how
to implement an attack at any location, work for inserting Trojan gates to emulate real-world
Trojans is on-going.
Future work will involve expanding the syntactical functionality of the tool to process
more complex design elements, as well as include new classifications of Trojans and the met-
rics necessary for finding them. At the time of writing, only a subset of the Verilog standard
can be parsed. Expanding the tool to manage more complex structures as well as integrate
lower-level design information, such as library cell information or timing specifications, could
enable more robust and accurate analysis. Additional classification methods will also need to
be developed to cover other types of Trojans, such as those that leak information described in
Section 2.1.1. Since those Trojan types differ in implementation and may make use of other
design details (such as physical layout information), more investigation will be necessary to
identify useful metrics to automatically identify them.
While the method presented here is limited in what types of sites it is capable of finding,
it achieves its goal of locating potential behavior modification Trojan locations quite well.
Evaluation of two separate designs with different functionalities has verified this approach’s
ability to automatically identify interesting locations for Trojans. Additionally, these exper-
iments have proven that the metrics the tool relies on can be used to identify locations that
an experienced designer, or attacker, might find by hand. This will allow for the creation of a
closed loop system to select locations, insert Trojans, emulate their behaviors, and evaluate
counter-measure instrumentation without the need for complete hand evaluation of design
elements. Together, all these elements will help secure electronic components and provide
safer and more reliable electronics.
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APPENDIX A
A.1 16-Bit MIPS Location Rankings
Rank Module Signal Score Line File
1 IF_stage pc 2.017 37 IF_stage.v
2 alu r 1.982 38 alu.v
3 alu r 1.982 28 alu.v
4 alu r 1.982 40 alu.v
5 alu r 1.982 26 alu.v
6 alu r 1.806 36 alu.v
7 IF_stage pc 1.602 39 IF_stage.v
8 WB_stage reg_write_data 1.205 39 WB_stage.v
9 alu r 1.204 34 alu.v
10 alu r 1.204 32 alu.v
Table A.1: Destructive Locations for 16-Bit MIPS Processor
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Rank Module Signal Score Line File
1 ID_stage ex_alu_cmd 0.602 203 ID_stage.v
2 register_file reg_write_dest 0.602 54 register_file.v
3 ID_stage ex_alu_cmd 0.602 196 ID_stage.v
4 ID_stage ex_alu_cmd 0.602 189 ID_stage.v
5 ID_stage ex_alu_cmd 0.602 182 ID_stage.v
6 ID_stage ex_alu_cmd 0.602 175 ID_stage.v
7 ID_stage ex_alu_cmd 0.602 168 ID_stage.v
8 ID_stage ex_alu_cmd 0.602 161 ID_stage.v
9 ID_stage ex_alu_cmd 0.602 154 ID_stage.v
10 ID_stage ex_alu_cmd 0.602 147 ID_stage.v
Table A.2: Intermittent Locations for 16-Bit MIPS Processor
Rank Module Signal Score Line File
1 mips_16_core_top ID_pipeline_reg_out 1.884 29 mips_16_core_top.v
2 mips_16_core_top instruction 1.869 28 mips_16_core_top.v
3 mips_16_core_top decoding_op_src2 1.415 38 mips_16_core_top.v
4 mips_16_core_top reg_read_addr_2 1.365 34 mips_16_core_top.v
5 mips_16_core_top branch_offset_imm 1.230 26 mips_16_core_top.v
6 mips_16_core_top pipeline_stall_n 1.146 25 mips_16_core_top.v
7 mips_16_core_top reg_read_addr_1 1.092 33 mips_16_core_top.v
8 mips_16_core_top decoding_op_src1 1.079 37 mips_16_core_top.v
9 mips_16_core_top reg_read_data_2 1.068 36 mips_16_core_top.v
10 mips_16_core_top EX_pipeline_reg_out 1.034 30 mips_16_core_top.v
Table A.3: Interconnect Locations for 16-Bit MIPS Processor
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A.2 User Inserted Navigation Controller Trojans
Trojan
Name










Effect: Disables input tied to emergency breaking function.
Allows other controls to continue operating uninhibited.
T1b Reliability
Attack
spi_if Activation: Timer periodically toggles on and off trigger
signals.
o_sclk Effect: Rudder and propeller will move on their own every
few seconds, ignoring input from user. Control is given back










Effect: Allows for input to be taken from another Joystick
connected to the controller. Essentially provides access for












Effect: Supplies rudder movement and propeller speed com-





pwm_if Activation: Timer activates trigger signal after 30 Seconds.
r_inactive_cntr
r_active_cntr





pwm_if Activation: Timer forces internal counters to hit maximum
value early.
r_xfer_state Effect: Propeller stops functioning and rudder’s range of
motion is removed.
Table A.4: Behavior Modification Trojans for Navigation Controller
A.3 Navigation Controller Location Rankings
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Rank Module Signal Name Signal Function Score
1 axi_router r_axi_router_int-
_data
Register for storing data
in AXI communication
3.177
2 pwm_if r_active_time Upper limit for transfer
time in PWM output
2.947
3 gps_if o_m0n_axi_rdata Output response for data
read in AXI transactions
2.709
4 keyboard_if o_m0n_axi_rdata Output response for data
read in AXI transactions
2.709
5 joystick_if o_m0n_axi_rdata Output response for data
read in AXI transactions
2.709
6 axi_router o_axi_router_wdata Location for writes to AXI
bus
2.594
7 propeller_servo_if o_m0n_axi_rdata Output response for data
read in AXI transactions
2.408
8 rudder_servo_if o_m0n_axi_rdata Output response for data
read in AXI transactions
2.408
9 propeller_servo_if o_m0n_axi_rdata Output response for data
read in AXI transactions
2.408
10 rudder_servo_if o_m0n_axi_rdata Output response for data








12 joystick_if r_spi_byte_cntr Counts number of bytes
received from SPI
2.325
13 gps_if r_urt_word_cntr Counts number of bytes
received from UART
2.149
14 register_rw o_data Output register 1.978
15 spi_if r_transfer_word-
_number
Countdown of words re-
maining in transfer
1.929
16 ps2_if r_transfer_bit_cntr Marks which bit is being





w_trj_ins_act_mon JTAG interface input 1.820
18 gps_control_code o_m0n_axi_rdata Output response for data
read in AXI transactions
1.806







IJTAG Boundry scan out-
put
0.615
Table A.5: Destructive Locations for Navigational Controller
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Rank Module Signal Name Signal Function Score
1 spi_if r_mosi_cpha0 SPI master to slave clock
phase setting. Ensures
data is transmitted and





Flag to specify if stop bit
(end of signal pulse) was
correctly created
1.518
3 gps_if o_m0n_axi_rresp Response to incoming
AXI message. Control
signal used to ensure
complete transmission
1.506
4 keyboard_if o_m0n_axi_rresp Response to incoming
AXI message
1.506
5 joystick_if o_m0n_axi_rresp RResponse to incoming
AXI message
1.506





Flag to specify if stop bit
(end of signal pulse) was
correctly created
1.505
8 spi_if r_mosi_cpha0 SPI master to slave clock
phase setting
1.355
9 gps_control_code o_m0n_axi_rresp Response to incoming
AXI message
1.177
10 propeller_servo_if o_m0n_axi_rresp Response to incoming
AXI message
0.993
11 rudder_servo_if o_m0n_axi_rresp Response to incoming
AXI message
0.993
12 gps_if o_m0n_axi_rresp Response to incoming
AXI message
0.993
13 keyboard_if o_m0n_axi_rresp Response to incoming
AXI message
0.993
14 gps_control_code o_m0n_axi_rresp Response to incoming
AXI message
0.993
15 joystick_if o_m0n_axi_rresp Response to incoming
AXI message
0.993
16 gps_control_code o_m0n_axi_rresp Response to incoming
AXI message
0.993
17 propeller_servo_if o_m0n_axi_rresp Response to incoming
AXI message
0.858
18 rudder_servo_if o_m0n_axi_rresp Response to incoming
AXI message
0.858
19 axi_router o_axi_router_rd_en Flag to specify that a read
request is present on the
AXI bus
0.605
20 axi_router o_axi_router_rd_en Flag to specify that a read
request is present on the
AXI bus
0.301
Table A.6: Intermittent Locations for Navigational Controller
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Flag to specify slave de-







AXI Target peripheral ad-






AXI Target peripheral ad-













AXI Target peripheral ad-






AXI Target peripheral ad-



























Data to write on AXI port
0
1.751
12 axi_router w_upm_mask Mask to select status bits
from AXI message. Used
to raise alarm signals
when certain bits are de-
tected.
1.519
13 propeller_servo_if w_esm_rdata Data from embedded mi-
crocontroller sent to pro-
peller logic (sent over
AXI)
1.519
14 gps_if w_ism_rdata Data sent to microcon-
troller from GPS sensor
(sent over AXI)
1.519
15 keyboard_if w_ism_rdata Data sent to microcon-
troller from keyboard
1.519
16 rudder_servo_if w_esm_rdata Data sent from microcon-
troller to rudder logic
1.519
17 joystick_if w_ism_rdata Data sent to microcon-
troller from joystick logic
1.519
18 gps_if w_esm_rdata Data sent from microcon-
troller to GPS sensor
1.519
19 joystick_if w_esm_rdata Data sent from microcon-
troller to joystick servo
1.519
20 axi_router w_rsr_status_updated Flag to specify if AXI
router status register has
been updated
1.000
Table A.7: Interconnect Locations for Navigational Controller
75
BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] S. Adee, “The hunt for the kill switch,” IEEE Spectrum, vol. 45, no. 5, pp. 34–39, May
2008. 4
[2] Xiaoxiao Wang, M. Tehranipoor, and J. Plusquellic, “Detecting malicious inclusions in
secure hardware: Challenges and solutions,” in 2008 IEEE International Workshop on
Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, June 2008, pp. 15–19. 5
[3] R. S. Chakraborty, S. Narasimhan, and S. Bhunia, “Hardware trojan: Threats and
emerging solutions,” in 2009 IEEE International High Level Design Validation and
Test Workshop, Nov 2009, pp. 166–171. 5
[4] M. Tehranipoor and F. Koushanfar, “A survey of hardware trojan taxonomy and
detection,” IEEE Design Test of Computers, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 10–25, Jan 2010. 5
[5] A. Crouch, E. Hunter, and P. L. Levin, “Enabling hardware trojan detection and
prevention through emulation,” in 2018 IEEE International Symposium on
Technologies for Homeland Security (HST), 2018, pp. 1–5. 7
[6] Y. Jin, N. Kupp, and Y. Makris, “Experiences in hardware trojan design and
implementation,” in 2009 IEEE International Workshop on Hardware-Oriented
Security and Trust, 2009, pp. 50–57. 7




[8] K. Basu and P. Mishra, “Efficient trace signal selection for post silicon validation and
debug,” in 2011 24th Internatioal Conference on VLSI Design, Jan 2011, pp. 352–357.
12
[9] K. Rahmani and P. Mishra, “Efficient signal selection using fine-grained combination
of scan and trace buffers,” in 2013 26th International Conference on VLSI Design and
2013 12th International Conference on Embedded Systems, Jan 2013, pp. 308–313. 12
[10] M. Li and A. Davoodi, “A hybrid approach for fast and accurate trace signal selection
for post-silicon debug,” IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated
Circuits and Systems, vol. 33, no. 7, pp. 1081–1094, July 2014. 12, 13
[11] J. Yang and N. A. Touba, “Efficient trace signal selection for silicon debug by error
transmission analysis,” IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated
Circuits and Systems, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 442–446, March 2012. 13
76
[12] A. Nahiyan, M. Sadi, R. Vittal, G. Contreras, D. Forte, and M. Tehranipoor,
“Hardware trojan detection through information flow security verification,” in 2017
IEEE International Test Conference (ITC), Oct 2017, pp. 1–10. 13, 14, 15
[13] T. Le, J. Di, M. Tehranipoor, and L. Wang, “Tracking data flow at gate-level through
structural,” in 2016 International Great Lakes Symposium on VLSI (GLSVLSI), May
2016, pp. 185–189. 13, 16
[14] W. Hu, B. Mao, J. Oberg, and R. Kastner, “Detecting hardware trojans with gate-level
information-flow tracking,” Computer, vol. 49, no. 8, pp. 44–52, Aug 2016. 14
[15] Y. Jin, B. Yang, and Y. Makris, “Cycle-accurate information assurance by
proof-carrying based signal sensitivity tracing,” in 2013 IEEE International
Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), June 2013, pp. 99–106.
14
[16] H. Salmani and M. Tehranipoor, “Trust-hub.org.” [Online]. Available:
https://trust-hub.org/benchmarks/trojan 15
[17] V. Jyothi, P. Krishnamurthy, F. Khorrami, and R. Karri, “Taint: Tool for automated
insertion of trojans,” in 2017 IEEE International Conference on Computer Design
(ICCD), Nov 2017, pp. 545–548. 15
[18] H. Salmani and M. M. Tehranipoor, “Vulnerability analysis of a circuit layout to
hardware trojan insertion,” IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security,
vol. 11, no. 6, pp. 1214–1225, June 2016. 16
[19] I. Ghosh, A. Raghunathan, and N. K. Jha, “A design-for-testability technique for
register-transfer level circuits using control/data flow extraction,” IEEE Transactions
on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems, vol. 17, no. 8, pp.
706–723, Aug 1998. 16, 17
[20] Zhigang Yin, Yinghua Min, and Xiaowei Li, “An approach to rtl fault extraction and
test generation,” in Proceedings 10th Asian Test Symposium, Nov 2001, pp. 219–224.
17
[21] T. Strauch, “A novel rtl atpg model based on gate inherent faults (gif-po) of complex
gates,” arXiv.org, Dec 15 2016, copyright - c© 2016. This work is published under
http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/ (the “License”). Notwithstanding
the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the
terms of the License; Last updated - 2019-04-13. 17
[22] “Verilator.” [Online]. Available: https://www.veripool.org/wiki/verilator 19
[23] “Verilog-perl.” [Online]. Available: https://www.veripool.org/wiki/verilog-perl 20
[24] K. D. Cooper and L. Torczon, “Chapter 5 - intermediate representations,” in
Engineering a Compiler (Second Edition), second edition ed., K. D. Cooper and
L. Torczon, Eds. Boston: Morgan Kaufmann, 2012, pp. 221 – 268. [Online]. Available:
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780120884780000050 23
77
[25] Doyya, “Educational 16-bit mips processor,” Mar 2012. [Online]. Available:
https://opencores.org/projects/mips_16 51, 52
[26] J. H. Saltzer, “Protection and the control of information sharing in multics,”
Communications of the ACM, vol. 17, no. 7, p. 388–402, Jan 1974. 55, 66
[27] “IEEE Standard for Test Access Port and Boundary-Scan Architecture,” Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Standard, Feb. 2013. 67
[28] M. Keating and P. Bricaud, Reuse methodology manual: for system-on-a-chip designs,
3rd ed. Kluwer Academic, 2002. 68
[29] “Welcome to python.org.” [Online]. Available: https://www.python.org/
78
